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Abstract
Private equity has transformed from a small asset class into a major player in the global econ-
omy. Despite being a U.S. invention, the private equity model has also managed to spread through-
out Europe. Recently, the spotlight has been put on the private equity industry for a number of
reasons: the recent financial crisis; the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act in the U.S. and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in the
E.U.; and the run of Mitt Romney, founder of the prestigious U.S. private equity firm Bain Capi-
tal, for President of the United States. Despite this attention, a comparative examination of private
equity regulation is absent from academic literature. This paper seeks to fill that gap and offers a
comparative assessment of the legal framework governing private equity firms and transactions in
both Europe and the U.S. This comparative examination will reveal that Europe has a particularly
restrictive legal environment, which one would assume would inhibit European private equity ac-
tivity and cause it to substantially lag behind the U.S. Nonetheless, underlying economic forces
have provided and continue to provide a boost to the European market, allowing Europe to com-
pete with the U.S. on an equal footing. Unraveling these underlying economic forces shall be
the other major goal of this paper. When it comes to European private equity, there is no cau-
sation between the strictness of the legal regime and economic development. Rather, economic
development shapes its own path and is unaffected by the prevailing legal regime.
KEYWORDS: Private Equity, International Law, Accounting
∗Research Fellow, New York University Pollack Center for Law and Business, 2012; LL.M., NYU
School of Law, 2011; LL.M., University College of London, 2009; L.L.B., Aristotle University
of Thessaloniki, 2007. This article was written during the author’s stay at the Pollack Center
for Law and Business. I would like to express my gratitude to the Pollack Center of Law and
Business for their continued research and academic support during the course of my fellowship
in 2011–2012. I would also like to thank Professor Ryan Bubb, NYU School of Law, for his
supervision and his suggestions, without which publication of this article would not have been
possible. This article has also greatly benefited from the meticulous work of the FJCFL editors.
Contact at alexseretakis@nyu.edu.
VOLUME XVIII 2013 NUMBER 3 
 
FORDHAM 
JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: ACCOUNTING FOR THE PAST 
AND PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Alexandros Seretakis 
 
  613
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE 
EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE PAST AND PREDICTING 
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY 
Alexandros Seretakis 
ABSTRACT 
Private equity has transformed from a small asset class into a major 
player in the global economy.  Despite being a U.S. invention, the 
private equity model has also managed to spread throughout Europe.  
Recently, the spotlight has been put on the private equity industry for 
a number of reasons: the recent financial crisis; the adoption of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the 
U.S. and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in the 
E.U.; and the run of Mitt Romney, founder of the prestigious U.S. 
private equity firm Bain Capital, for President of the United States.  
Despite this attention, a comparative examination of private equity 
regulation is absent from academic literature.  This paper seeks to fill 
that gap and offers a comparative assessment of the legal framework 
governing private equity firms and transactions in both Europe and 
the U.S.  This comparative examination will reveal that Europe has a 
particularly restrictive legal environment, which one would assume 
would inhibit European private equity activity and cause it to 
substantially lag behind the U.S.  Nonetheless, underlying economic 
forces have provided and continue to provide a boost to the 
European market, allowing Europe to compete with the U.S. on an 
equal footing.  Unraveling these underlying economic forces shall be 
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the other major goal of this paper.  When it comes to European 
private equity, there is no causation between the strictness of the 
legal regime and economic development.  Rather, economic 
development shapes its own path and is unaffected by the prevailing 
legal regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Private equity has, for the first time, allowed ordinary citizens to act 
as the “capitalist” during one of capitalism’s periodic frenzies of 
“creative destruction.”  This is giving the “little guy,” via his or her 
pension fund, 80% of the upside in wealth creation that has 
historically been the exclusive preserve of the Rockefellers and 
Mellons of the world.1 
Thirty-four years after Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. 
(“KKR”) raised the first ever private equity fund to finance leveraged 
buyouts (“LBOs”),2 private equity firms are now widely regarded as the 
new kings of capitalism.3  Fueled by an abundance of liquidity in the 
financial system, private equity activity reached its greatest heights 
between 2003 and 2007.  The peak of this period came in 2007, when an 
investor group led by KKR and Texas Pacific Group (“TPG”) completed 
the buyout of TXU, which remains the biggest LBO in history.4  This 
golden era ended with the bursting of the housing bubble and 
subsequent credit crunch, which caused the collapse of the private 
equity market as bidders tried to terminate or renegotiate their pending 
acquisitions.5  Today, private equity activity has made some progress 
towards recovering but is still far from its heyday; this can be attributed 
to the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe as well as fragile debt 
markets, which further strain deal financing and evidence the 
dependency of private equity activity on credit market conditions. 6  
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Jenny Anderson, Stephen Schwarzman Speaks, DEALBOOK (Nov. 27, 2007, 
8:04 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/stephen-schwarzman-speaks/. 
 2.  GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL 
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 
59 (1998). 
 3. The New Kings of Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/3398496. 
 4. In TXU’s $45 Billion Deal, Many Shades of Green, DEALBOOK (Feb. 26, 2007, 
10:12 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/in-txus-45-billion-deal-many-
shades-of-green/. 
 5. The total value of transactions terminated by private equity bidders exceeded 
$168 billion. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in 
Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default 2 (Sept. 11, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540000. 
 6. Ulf Axelson et al., Borrow Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage 
and Pricing in Buyouts, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596019. 
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Nevertheless, the LBO association has managed to establish itself as a 
dominant organizational form providing an attractive alternative to the 
public corporation.  Though Michael Jensen’s famed 1989 prediction 
that the LBO association would eclipse the public corporation7 never 
materialized, the private equity model has successfully challenged the 
predominance of the publicly held corporation. 
Private equity, a U.S. invention, gained mainstream attention 
during the takeover boom of the 1980s.  According to Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 57% of large U.S. firms were either takeover targets or 
underwent a restructuring between 1982 and 1989.8  During this period, 
private equity received negative criticism due to its association with 
hostile takeovers and corporate bust-ups.  However, in the years 
following, the private equity industry managed to disassociate itself 
from corporate raiders and their abusive practices, instead building the 
profile of a cutting edge industry that would promote U.S. economic 
growth.  As a headquarter to many of the major industry players, the 
U.S. private equity market remains the most mature market worldwide.  
Nevertheless, buyout activity started spreading, particularly in Europe, 
after 1996.9  Between 2000 and 2004, Western Europe surpassed the 
U.S. in buyout activity, accounting for 48.9% of worldwide transaction 
value.10  The U.K. represents the most active European private equity 
market both in terms of transaction value and volume, as the majority of 
European and U.S. private equity firms operating in Europe are 
headquartered there.  The U.K.’s attractiveness is based on its stable and 
favorable regulatory environment, sophisticated third-party advisers, 
well-developed debt and equity capital markets, and positive attitude 
towards entrepreneurial risk.  Germany and France, the largest and 
second largest European economies respectively, distantly follow the 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation 1–2 (1997) 
(unpublished revision, originally published as Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the 
Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=146149. 
 8. Mark L. Mitchell & Harold J. Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on 
Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199 (1996). 
 9. Mike Wright et al., Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: 
Retrospect and Prospect, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2006, at 38. 
 10. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 121, 128. 
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U.K. 11   The underdevelopment of the private equity industry in 
continental Europe is attributable to a lagging financial infrastructure, 
unfavorable legal and fiscal environments for private equity 
investments, a risk-averse culture, and thin equity markets.12  Europe 
and the U.S. combined represent the majority of worldwide private 
equity activity in terms of transaction value.13 In contrast, private equity 
in emerging markets is either underdeveloped or employs a different 
model than the US and Europe altogether.14 
The aim of this article is twofold.  The first aim is to offer a 
comparative assessment of the legal framework governing the financing 
and structuring of private equity transactions15 as well as the regulation 
of private equity firms in Europe and the U.S.  As this comparative 
examination will reveal, private equity is subject to particularly stringent 
requirements in Europe both on a transactional and, subsequent to the 
adoption of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(“AIFM Directive”), fund manager level.  One would therefore expect 
that the legal regime would affect the development of the European 
private equity market by inhibiting its activity and causing it to 
substantially lag behind the U.S. market.  The second aim of the article 
is to both account for the past and predict the future of European private 
equity.  Despite the strict legal regime, private equity activity in Europe 
                                                                                                                                         
    11. Wright et al., supra note 9, at 38, 39.  
 12. Id. at 52–53. A well-developed stock market is important for a flourishing 
private equity industry, since it offers private equity investors the possibility to exit 
their investment through an initial public offering (“IPO”). See generally Bernard S. 
Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market?, J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1999, at 36. 
   13. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 121, 127. 
 14. For instance, while Brazil is one of the hottest markets for private equity firms, 
the private equity model employed by Brazil relies less on debt financing and the 
relevant deals usually involve minority acquisitions in medium-sized companies. See 
Alternative Investments in Brazil: The Buys from Brazil, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 
2011, at 5, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18178275.  In China, another 
lucrative market for private equity, a wide variety of industries are considered to be 
“strategic.”  Therefore, controlling investments in these companies are either prohibited 
or subject to governmental approval.  As a result, private equity is confined to non-
controlling participations. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2010, at 3–4, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
17580583. 
 15. This article will concentrate on public-to-private transactions.  A public-to-
private transaction involves the leveraged acquisition of a listed company that is 
subsequently delisted from the stock exchange and transformed into a private company. 
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has and will continue to grow at levels similar to those in the U.S.  This 
growth can be attributed to underlying economic forces.  The 
development of the single market, introduction of the euro, growth of 
European capital markets, liquidity boom in the European financial 
system, financialization of Europe, and move towards the Anglo-Saxon 
capitalist model has contributed to the growth of European private 
equity activity, particularly during the last decade.  While there are fears 
that the adoption of the AIFM Directive will inhibit buyout activity in 
Europe, underlying economic forces, albeit different from those that 
drove the last boom, will fuel further growth of the European private 
equity market.  The current sovereign debt crisis in Europe will spark 
vast reforms in European countries.  These reforms, most notably labor 
deregulation and privatizations, will provide a boost to European public-
to-private activity. 
The article will proceed as follows.  Part I of this article will offer 
an overview of private equity, the structure of a typical public-to-private 
transaction, the history of private equity in the U.S. and certain 
European countries, and the sources of value creation in LBOs.  Part II 
of the article will examine the legal rules governing the financing and 
structuring of public-to-private transactions on both continents.  Part III 
of this article will be devoted to a comparative analysis of the regulation 
of private equity firms in the U.S. and Europe, including an assessment 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”) and the AIFM Directive.  Part IV will offer an 
account of the past and a prediction of the future of European private 
equity, as well as seek to explain why its development remains 
unaffected by the hostile European legal regime.  We will attempt to 
unravel the economic forces that have and will continue to provide a 
boost to private equity activity, allowing Europe to compete with the 
U.S. on an equal footing. 
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I. PRIVATE EQUITY, ITS HISTORY, AND SOURCES OF VALUE CREATION 
A. WHAT IS PRIVATE EQUITY? 
Private equity is a generic term encompassing a wide variety of 
investments. 16   The customary characteristic of private equity 
investments is illiquidity,17 since private equity involves unregistered 
securities. 18   Private equity includes venture capital, development 
capital, mezzanine capital, LBOs, and distressed investing.19  Venture 
capital funds provide financing to start-ups and early stage firms, 
thereby contributing to macroeconomic growth and job creation. 20  
Development capital involves the provision of funds to existing 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. Private equity funds are different than hedge funds.  While private equity funds 
concentrate their investments in illiquid securities, hedge funds invest in publicly traded 
securities pursuing short-term investment strategies.  As it is often said, private equity is 
focused on creating value.  By contrast, hedge funds pursue an investment strategy of 
finding value.  However, recent years have seen the convergence of hedge funds and 
private equity funds.  In particular, hedge funds are increasingly making long-term 
investments in public corporations and becoming involved in their corporate 
governance.  A recent phenomenon is hedge funds competing with private equity funds 
to take companies private. See generally Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After 
the Crisis: Global Convergence of Private Equity and Hedge Funds, 29 NW. J. ’INT’L L. 
& BUS. 603 (2009); Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the 
Lines Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251 (2006); 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 
244 (2008).    
 17. Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. BUS. 
ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 559, 564 (2011) (U.K.). 
 18. JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
NON-LISTED COMPANIES 171 (2008). 
 19. ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 7 
(2006); PETER TEMPLE, PRIVATE EQUITY: EXAMINING THE NEW CONGLOMERATES OF 
EUROPEAN BUSINESS 4 (1999).  Private equity has diversified over time.  Private 
Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) are the latest innovation in the private equity 
market.  In a typical PIPE transaction, a public corporation will issue common stock or 
securities convertible into common stock in a private placement to a private equity 
investor.  PIPE issuers are usually small cap companies with a weak stock price unable 
to raise capital in the public equity markets.  See CYRIL DEMARIA, INTRODUCTION TO 
PRIVATE EQUITY 96 (2010); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 381, 386 (2007). 
 20. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2003). 
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companies to support their expansion. 21   Mezzanine funds provide 
financing to LBOs in the form of subordinated debt, with equity 
participation in the form of warrants to subscribe for shares in the 
borrower. 22   Distressed debt investors purchase debt of troubled 
companies at a discount, and then use their rights as debtholders to 
promote a restructuring of the company.23 
The most well known category of private equity transactions is 
LBOs.  In a typical LBO, a private equity firm will acquire control of an 
already existing business using a small amount of equity and a large 
amount of debt. The transaction is defined as a public-to-private 
transaction when the target of an LBO is a public company that is 
subsequently delisted from the stock exchange and transformed into a 
private company.  Subcategories of LBOs are management buyouts, 
management buy-ins, and institutional buyouts.  In a management 
buyout, the incumbent management will partner with a private equity 
investor to privatize the company.  Management will obtain a significant 
stake in this new company.  Conversely, in the case of a management 
buy-in, an outside management team backed by a private equity investor 
leads the bidding.  In an institutional buyout, a private equity firm buys 
a company, with its incumbent management typically receiving an 
equity stake in the company as part of its remuneration package.24 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. TEMPLE, supra note 19, at 4. 
 22. Payne, supra note 17, at 569; GEOFF YATES & MIKE HINCHLIFFE, A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS 193 (2010). 
 23. A popular strategy for distressed debt investors is to engage in loan-to-own 
transactions, whereby investors acquire the debt of a company with a view to 
converting it into equity and obtaining control of the company.  An example of a 
successful distressed debt investment was Yucaipa’s investment in the debt of Allied 
Holdings, Inc.  After Allied entered into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Yucaipa 
purchased debt in the company and used its leverage as a debtholder to influence the 
terms of Allied’s reorganization plan.  Yucaipa emerged as the controlling shareholder 
in the reorganized company by exchanging its debt for a controlling equity stake.  See 
Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of 
Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 719–20 (2008). 
 24. In both a management buyout and an institutional buyout, the incumbent 
management will end up with a stake in the acquired company.  The difference lies in 
the way that management obtains its equity stake.  In the case of a management buyout, 
the incumbent management gains its stake by being part of the bidding group, whereas 
in the case of an institutional buyout the equity stake is granted to management as part 
of its new remuneration package. 
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Private equity investments are channeled through specialized 
intermediaries that are usually organized as limited partnerships, 25 
commonly known as private equity funds.  Private equity firms such as 
KKR, Blackstone, and TPG periodically establish private equity funds 
in the form of limited partnerships 26  where they serve as general 
partners.  The general partner is responsible for managing the fund.  
Furthermore, the general partner solicits capital from investors, who are 
the limited partners of these funds.27  The principal investors in private 
equity funds are institutional investors such as pension funds, 28 
university endowments, insurance companies, and banks, as well as 
wealthy individuals. 29   Private equity firms usually invest a certain 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. The preference for investing in an issuer through intermediaries rather than by 
direct investment is based on the complexity of private equity investments.  The 
extensive pre-screening and post-investment monitoring required for private equity 
investments are more efficiently performed by specialized intermediaries, rather than by 
a large number of outside investors. See GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STAFF SERIES 168, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY 
MARKET 28 (1995). 
 26. Funds are organized as limited partnerships in order to take advantage of the 
pass-through tax treatment of partnership profits.  Tax liability on partnership profits is 
not incurred at the entity level, but is rather passed on to the individual investor. See 
Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133, 136 
(2003). 
 27. Investors commit to provide capital to the private equity fund.  Once an 
investment opportunity is identified, the fund manager sends a notification to the 
investors and draws down committed capital equal to the amount required for the 
specific investment. See Per Strömberg, The Economic and Social Impact of Private 
Equity in Europe: Summary of Research Findings 4 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429322. 
 28. Public pension funds have been a major source of financing for private equity 
firms.  See Steven M. Davidoff, Wall St.’s Odd Couple and Their Quest to Unlock 
Riches, DEALBOOK (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/ 
13/wall-st-s-odd-couple-and-their-quest-to-unlock-riches/ (describing private equity 
firms’ love affair with public pension funds). 
 29. In order to avoid securities regulation, private equity funds are closed to retail 
investors and offered solely to “sophisticated” investors.  However, recent years have 
seen the rise of what Steven Davidoff refers to as “black market capital.”  Recently 
emerging capital market phenomena such as special purpose acquisition companies 
(SPACs), business development corporations (BDCs), and exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) seek to replicate private equity.  SPACs raise funds through an IPO in order to 
complete acquisitions of private companies by employing structures and practices 
comparable to private equity.  BDCs invest in debt securities associated with private 
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amount of capital into the fund30 in order to ensure an alignment of 
interests with the other fund investors.31  Such funds are “closed-end” 
vehicles, meaning that investors cannot withdraw their capital during the 
life of the fund.32  The funds have a fixed life, typically of ten years with 
the possibility of a two-year extension.  Therefore, private equity firms 
must regularly return to the market and raise new capital.  To do this, the 
firms must have earned a reputation for delivering superior returns in 
their previous funds.33 
Private equity firms are responsible for managing the fund as 
general partners, as well as selecting and managing the investments.  
During the first three to five years of the fund’s life—the investment 
period—the private equity firm will deploy its capital to acquire 
companies.  During the remaining years of the fund’s life—the holding 
period—the private equity firm manages and eventually sells the 
investments. 
The compensation of the general partner consists of an annual 
management fee and a share of the fund’s profits, known as carried 
interest.  The management fee usually amounts to 2% of all capital and 
the carried interest is commonly set at 20% of the fund’s profits. 34  The 
carried interest is typically claimed after the investors’ capital has been 
returned and a designated rate of return called the hurdle rate, typically 
                                                                                                                                         
equity transactions while ETFs can track private equity performance. See generally 
Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172 (2008). 
 30. Usually 1% of the total capital. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 123. 
 31. See Payne, supra note 17, at 563. 
 32. The illiquidity of investments in private equity funds has been remedied by the 
rise of a secondary market in limited partnership interests.  Subject to the general 
partner’s approval, investors in private equity funds are able to transfer their partnership 
interests in the secondary market. 
 33. This high-powered incentive of private equity firms to show good performance 
is being compromised by the public listing of private equity firms.  A public listing 
allows private equity fund managers to obtain permanent capital and, therefore, makes  
the raising of new funds in the market unnecessary. See Michael C. Jensen, The 
Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some Concerns) (Harvard NOM Working 
Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=963530. 
 34. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private 
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008). 
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set at 8%, has been achieved.35  In addition, private equity firms charge 
monitoring and deal fees on the companies in which they invest.36 
Though limited partners benefit from the fact that their liability is 
capped at the amount of their invested capital in the fund, their inability 
to participate in the fund’s management exposes them to the 
opportunistic behavior of the general partner.  Partnership agreements 
regulating the relationship between general and limited partners contain 
a number of provisions seeking to restrain the general partner’s 
discretion.  These covenants include: limits on the amount the fund can 
invest in a single company, restrictions on the types of assets that the 
fund can purchase, and restrictions on the general partner’s outside 
activities.37  In addition, private equity firms periodically provide reports 
to the limited partners detailing the value and progress of the fund’s 
portfolio. 38   Private equity funds also establish special advisory 
committees with the participation of limited partners.39 
B. THE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING OF A PRIVATE EQUITY FUND’S 
PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TRANSACTION 
In order to complete a public-to-private transaction, a private equity 
buyer will create a special purpose vehicle with no material assets to 
acquire the target company.  The private equity fund will not be a party 
to the transaction and therefore avoids any liabilities.  Τhe fund will 
control the acquisition vehicle, subscribe shares in it, and make an 
additional investment through a loan note in the vehicle.40  Management 
                                                                                                                                         
 35. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRIVATE EQUITY: A DISCUSSION OF RISK AND REGULATORY 
ENGAGEMENT 24 ¶ 3.16 (2006).  It is often argued that since the size of the carried 
interest depends on performance, carried interest creates a powerful incentive for 
private equity fund managers to achieve good returns. See Fleischer, supra note 34, at 
8. However, in reality, the general partner derives the majority of its compensation from 
fixed revenue components, namely, management and transaction fees.  Only one-third 
of the general partner’s compensation is performance-based and derived from the 
carried interest. See Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private 
Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2327–28 (2010). 
 36.  Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 35, at 2314.  
 37. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of 
Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J. L. & ECON. 463, 479–84 (1996). 
 38. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital 
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON.. 473, 492 (1990). 
 39. Id. at 493. 
 40. YATES & HINCHLIFFE, supra note 22, at 50. 
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will also subscribe to shares in the vehicle, though it will be a small 
fraction of the total equity component.41  The capital raised, along with 
debt, will be used to finance the purchase of a public company.  The 
target company’s shareholders will receive cash and retain no interest in 
the post-acquisition company. 
In a public-to-private transaction, between 60% and 70% of the 
purchase price is funded by debt. 42   In the years prior to the 2008 
financial crisis (“Financial Crisis”), the availability of debt increased 
significantly and the secondary market for bank debt buoyed, which 
helped contribute to the LBO boom.43  Another hallmark of these golden 
years was the rise and expansion of the collateralized loan obligation 
(“CLO”) market.44  These two markets allowed banks to unload risky 
loans from their balance sheets, raising concerns about their monitoring 
and screening incentives.45 
Another result of the overly liquid and relaxed lending standards 
was the emergence of “covenant-lite” loans and “payment-in-kind” 
toggle notes.  In a typical loan transaction, the lender will impose 
financial covenants on the borrower, such as a requirement to maintain 
monthly or quarterly performance standards.  Covenant-lite loans part 
with maintenance covenants and instead include looser incurrence 
                                                                                                                                         
 41. Id. at 52. 
 42. In the wake of the Financial Crisis, a growing number of deals are financed 
solely through equity.  Examples include Apax Partner’s acquisition of Bankrate and 
Apollo’s acquisition of Parallel Petroleum. See Steven M. Davidoff, Bankrate: A New 
Model for Private Equity Deals, DEALBOOK (July 24, 2009, 1:02 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/bankrate-a-new-model-for-private-equity-
deals/; Steven M. Davidoff, New Model Emerging for Private Equity Deals, DEALBOOK 
(Sept. 16, 2009, 2:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/new-model-
emerging-for-private-equity-deals/. 
 43. Viral Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom or Bust?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 
Fall 2007, at 44. 
 44. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Debt Market’s Slow Recovery is Burdened by New 
Regulation, DEALBOOK (Jan. 31, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/ 
01/31/a-debt-markets-slow-recovery-is-burdened-by-new-regulation/.  A collateralized 
loan obligation is a debt security issued by a special purpose vehicle and backed by 
loans extended to finance leveraged buyouts.  The debt securities are divided in several 
tranches with different maturity, interest and repayment schedules. See Anil Shivdasani 
& Yihui Wang, Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?, 66 J. FIN. 1291, 1295 
(2011). 
 45. Acharya et al., supra note 43, at 3. 
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covenants, allowing the borrower to take a variety of actions such as 
paying a dividend and incurring additional debt so long as a certain 
threshold has not been exceeded.46 
Private equity firms Warburg Pincus LLC and TPG were the first to 
use payment-in-kind toggle notes during their buyout of luxury retailer 
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.47  These securities allow issuers to pay 
interest to lenders or note holders either in cash or by issuing more 
securities (in-kind). 
The debt component of a typical public-to-private transaction 
includes senior debt, second-lien debt, mezzanine debt, and high-yield 
bonds.  Senior debt comprises the majority of the debt incurred in an 
LBO transaction, is secured by the target’s assets and shares on a first-
ranking basis, and is divided into three separate term loans and a 
revolving facility.  The term loans are used to fund the purchase price, 
whereas the revolving facility is used to fund the target’s working-
capital requirements. 
Second-lien debt developed in the U.S. during the 1990s and is 
secured by the same assets or shares as senior debt, though it ranks 
secondary to senior debt in priority.  Hedge funds have historically been 
the main investors in second-lien debt,48 though a variety of institutional 
investors, including banks, are increasingly becoming involved in this 
type of financing.49 
Mezzanine debt is subordinate to senior debt as well, and carries a 
higher interest rate to compensate lenders for their inferior position in 
case of the issuer defaults.50  Mezzanine lenders usually obtain share 
                                                                                                                                         
    46. Financial covenants can be separated in two broad categories: maintenance and       
incurrence covenants.  Maintenance covenants, which are used in most credit 
agreements, require the borrower to adhere to a financial ratio test at regular intervals, 
usually at the end of each quarter.  On the contrary, incurrence covenants oblige the 
borrower to meet a financial ratio test upon the occurrence of an event such as the 
incurrence of additional debt.  Incurrence covenants are common to high yield bonds. 
See A Beginner’s Guide to Thinking About Covenants, BANKING AND FINANCE MARKET 
SNAPSHOT, (Kramer Levin), Dec. 2006, at 2.  
 47. Henny Sender, What’s Aiding Buyout Boom: Toggle Notes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
21, 2007, at C1. 
 48. LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICY 669 (2011). 
 49. Id. 
    50. While both second-lien and mezzanine debt are subordinate to senior debt, 
second-lien debt benefits from a second-ranking security on the borrower’s assets. On 
the contrary, mezzanine capital is typically unsecured. See Arthur D. Robinson et al., 
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warrants, allowing them to subscribe for shares in the portfolio company 
under certain circumstances, such as a sale or IPO. 
High-yield bonds are another important source of financing for 
LBOs.  These debt securities were developed and perfected by the 
infamous Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham and Lambert.  They are 
mainly purchased by institutional investors, are rated below investment 
grade, and usually carry a fixed interest rate.  A crucial advantage of 
high-yield bonds is the inclusion of more flexible incurrence-based 
covenants, rather than covenants requiring the borrower to maintain 
ongoing financial capital ratios. 
Once the financing has been put in place, a private equity fund, 
acting through the acquisition vehicle, will complete the target 
acquisition and transform the company into a privately held company.  
After the target company has gone “dark”, the private equity investors 
will work with management to increase the target company’s value. 
A private equity fund’s fixed duration motivates its managers to 
quickly restructure their portfolio companies and exit their investments.  
The main exit strategies for private equity investors are the sale of a 
portfolio company to a strategic buyer, called a trade sale; an initial 
public offering; a sale to another private equity fund, called a secondary 
buyout; or a leveraged dividend recapitalization.51  
C. THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE 
In the U.S., the modern LBO model traces its roots back to the late 
1960s.  While at Bear Stearns, Jerome Kohlberg, Henry Kravis, and 
George Roberts established a unit that specialized in LBOs of private 
                                                                                                                                         
Mezzanine Finance: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW – THE JOURNAL (Feb. 2013), available 
at http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46116602D7EAD896B179 
&TrackedFolder=585C1D235281AED996A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899.  
 51. In a leveraged dividend recapitalization, the portfolio company will issue debt 
and use the proceeds to pay a special dividend to the private equity investors.  Dividend 
recapitalizations have been heavily criticized for allowing private equity investors to 
reap a quick profit while saddling the portfolio company with more debt. See Ryan 
Dezember & Matt Wirz, Debt Fuels a Dividend Boom. WALL ST. J., October 19, 2012, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578064672995 
070116.html. 
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family firms.52  In 1976, the trio decided to leave Bear Stearns and form 
the first-ever private equity firm, KKR.53  KKR raised its first private 
equity fund devoted to financing public-to-private buyouts in 1978.  The 
buyout of Houdaille Industries, completed in 1979, was the first LBO of 
a large public company. 54   The successful closing of the deal soon 
attracted attention, and imitations followed. 
The development of a liquid high-yield debt market was pioneered 
by Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert, and contributed to the 
LBO boom of the 1980s.  The privatization of RJR Nabisco highlighted 
the excesses of the era.  Political backlash against highly leveraged 
transactions, tightened credit markets, and the collapse of the high-yield 
debt market put an end to the boom, and the 1990s saw a substantial 
decline in U.S. LBO activity.55  However, the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (“SOX”) on corporate governance increased the costs of 
being a public company56 and provided a boost to private equity activity, 
which resumed in 1997.  The period between 2003 and 2007 saw a 
meteoric rise in private equity activity, and firms such as KKR, 
Blackstone, and TPG executed multi-billion dollar public-to-private 
transactions.  This wave of public-to-private transactions is attributable 
to vast inflows of capital into private equity funds, easy credit, and 
public company CEO’s growing receptiveness to private equity. 57   
Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis caused the collapse of the U.S. private 
equity market and revealed deep flaws in its structure.58  In the aftermath 
                                                                                                                                         
 52. BAKER & SMITH, supra note 2, at 52; Allen Kaufman & Ernest J. Englander, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and the Restructuring of American Capitalism, 67 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 52, 67–68 (1993). 
 53. Kaufman & Englander, supra note 52, at 67–68. 
 54. Id. at 71. 
 55. In addition, U.S. corporations’ adoption of shareholder-friendly policies by 
U.S. corporations, such as the rise of incentive-based compensation and active 
monitoring of management by institutional investors, made LBOs unnecessary. See 
Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in 
the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, 
at 132–36. 
 56. For a criticism of SOX, see generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
 57. Steven N. Kaplan, Private Equity: Past, Present and Future, 19 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2007). 
 58. An innovation of the private equity golden era was the reverse termination fee. 
Private equity buyers were able to back out of a deal by paying a fee to the target 
company.  This made the completion of deals optional. ’ Thus, during the financial 
 
628 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
of the Financial Crisis, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is still 
causing tight credit markets that constrain U.S. private equity activity. 
Within Europe, private equity was first developed in the U.K., 
which experienced a buyout boom during the 1980s.  An important 
development that contributed to the boom was a change in the U.K.’s 
legislative framework; prior to 1981, it was illegal for a target company 
to grant a security to a bidder for the purpose of acquiring its own 
shares.59  The Companies Act of 1981 allowed the granting of securities 
subject to the fulfillment of certain requirements.60  The buyout boom 
ended with the recession of the early 1990s.  However, private equity 
activity eventually resumed, reaching a peak in 2000 before declining 
due to the dot-com bubble bursting and the repercussions that followed.  
The last buyout boom in the U.K. started in 2003 and lasted until the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2007.  In 2007, Alliance Boots went 
private with the help of KKR and its largest shareholder, Stefano 
Pessina.  This was the first ever public-to-private transaction involving a 
FTSE 100 company, and was the largest buyout in Europe to date.61 
LBO activity in continental Europe never reached the maturity and 
depth of the U.S. or U.K. markets, but there were still periods when the 
private equity market thrived.  The first LBO boom came during the late 
1980s, followed by a dormant market during the early 1990s.  Activity 
picked up again in the late 1990s, and 2003 marked the start of the 
golden era of private equity in continental Europe.  Two of the biggest 
public-to-private transactions in continental Europe—the buyout of 
Danish telecommunications giant TDC and the leveraged acquisition of 
a controlling stake in the semiconductor unit of Royal Philips 
Electronics—both took place in 2006.62  As far as individual European 
                                                                                                                                         
crisis, private equity firms were able to easily terminate their pending acquisitions. See 
generally Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 
(2009). 
 59.  JOHN GILLIGAN & MIKE WRIGHT, ICAEW CORPORATE FINANCE FACULTY, 
PRIVATE EQUITY DEMYSTIFIED—AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE 16 (2d ed. 2010). 
 60. GILLIGAN & WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 16. 
 61. Julia Finch, Pessina Wins the Battle for Boots, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/apr/25/privateequity.retail. 
 62.  See Telis Demos, NXP Semiconductor Launches Secondary Offering, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/aa0d191a-57c7-11e0-9abf-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1yMhK70Mn; Heather Timmons, TDC Joins Spree of E.U. 
Buyouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/business/ 
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countries are concerned, Germany and France represent the largest 
individual private equity markets in continental Europe, due in part to 
the size of their economies. 
The birth of the LBO model in Germany has been attributed to the 
existence of family offices, which provided the necessary initial capital 
for the first LBOs.63  Private equity activity remained subdued until the 
late 1990s and mostly concentrated on the so-called Mittelstand 
companies,64 which form the backbone of the German economy.  1997 
was a landmark year for private equity in Germany. 65  Major 
corporations started spinning off underperforming businesses, while 
executives became more receptive to private equity buyouts.66  The dot 
com bubble caused private equity activity in Germany to slow down 
considerably, but the market quickly picked up; between 2004 and 2007, 
the number of LBOs grew exponentially. 67   However, the German 
market was not immune to the Financial Crisis, which caused a 
substantial drop in German private equity activity.  
While the U.S. and the U.K. were experiencing their LBO booms 
during the 1980s, private equity remained largely unknown in France for 
a better part of the decade.  Certain buyout shops, including LBO France 
established in 1985, led the way and started utilizing the LBO model to 
take over small family businesses.68  The private equity market in France 
grew substantially during the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a number 
of U.K. buyout firms opening offices in Paris.69  However, it was not 
until the early 2000s that France experienced an LBO boom, fueled by 
the willingness of banks to lend, the rise of the junk bond market, and 
the flow of institutional investor funds into private equity.70  Two of the 
                                                                                                                                         
worldbusiness/30iht-tdc.html?_r=1. 
 63. PAUL JOWETT & FRANCOISE JOWETT, PRIVATE EQUITY: THE GERMAN 
EXPERIENCE 75 (2011). 
 64. The term “Mittelstand” refers to family-owned small and medium-sized 
German businesses. See Brian Blackstone & Vanessa Fuhrmans, The Engines of 
Growth, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703509104576329643153915516.html. 
   65. JOWETT & JOWETT, supra note 63, at 300. 
    66. Id. 
    67. Id. at 426. 
 68. David Carey, The Downstroke of PE in France, DEAL MAG., Feb. 17, 2012, 
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/044719/features/the-downstroke-of-pe-in-
france.php. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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biggest buyouts in French history—the acquisition of a controlling block 
in PagesJaunes and the LBO of Rexel—were completed between 2006 
and 2007.71  Although the French market was not immune from the 
Financial Crisis, it is interesting to note that the French buyout market 
rebounded quickly and France still remains a dominant force in the 
European private equity market. 
D. SOURCES OF VALUE CREATION IN LBOS 
After a buyout has been completed, private equity firms work 
alongside management to increase the value of the company and reap 
any profit generated by successfully exiting their investment via a trade 
sale, a secondary buyout, or a flotation.  Various explanations have been 
offered for the sources of value creation in LBOs. 
1. Corporate Governance Engineering 
In their seminal book, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property,72 Berle and Means observed that separation of ownership and 
control plagued the modern publicly held corporation.73  This separation 
creates an agency problem, as the interests of diffuse principal-
shareholders and agent-managers often diverge.74  Shareholders want to 
maximize the profit of the firm, while managers tend to be risk averse, 
prone to slack, and interested in maximizing the size of the firm.  
                                                                                                                                         
 71. See Jason Singer, France Télécom Will Sell Its Stake in Yellow Pages to KKR, 
Goldman, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB115367846787314758.html?mod=home_whats_news_us; Peter Smith, Rexel Picks 
Four Banks for Float, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
4361d36e-55a0-11db-acba-0000779e2340.html#axzz1yMhK70Mn. 
 72. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 73. Id. at 355; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). 
 74. REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 22 (2004).  This separation of ownership 
and control offers important benefits as well.  Shareholders specializing in risk bearing 
are able to profit from business opportunities even though they lack managerial skills.  
All the same, managers without significant personal wealth can also pursue profitable 
ventures. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983). 
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Agency costs75 arise as a result.  Private equity has been praised for 
applying governance mechanisms that reduce these costs.76 
Private equity investors ensure an alignment of managerial and 
shareholder interests by giving management substantial ownership 
positions in portfolio companies through stocks and options.  In 
addition, investors require the management team to invest a significant 
part of their personal wealth in the company.  Executives in charge of 
running the company have a strong incentive to perform because they 
will profit heavily from any upside, but will also stand to lose part of 
their personal wealth in case of suboptimal performance. 
Another mechanism that reduces agency costs is the highly 
indebted structure of companies acquired through LBO transactions.  
Michael Jensen has pointed out the agency costs generated by free cash 
flow;77 for example, managers have an incentive to spend excess cash 
flow in negative present value projects.  By issuing debt, managers are 
bonding their promise to pay out future excess cash flows instead of 
using them inefficiently.  In addition, the threat of bankruptcy resulting 
from failure to meet interest and principal repayments motivates the 
management team to run the company efficiently. 
After an LBO, the private equity investor will end up holding a 
majority stake in the target company.  The creation of a large 
stakeholder provides both stronger incentives and more information to 
                                                                                                                                         
 75. Jensen and Meckling define agency costs as the sum of (a) the costs incurred in 
monitoring the agents, which are borne by shareholders; (b) the bonding costs incurred 
by managers; and (c) the residual loss incurred due to divergence between the 
manager’s decisions and the decisions that would maximize shareholder welfare. See 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 76. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 219, 227 (2009).  However, one should note that governance engineering applies 
solely to publicly held corporations with a diffuse ownership structure.  This corporate 
model is prevalent in the U.S. and U.K. On the contrary, corporations in Continental 
Europe are dominated by controlling shareholders that are able to effectively monitor 
management.  Therefore, corporate governance engineering is unlikely to be a source of 
value creation in buyouts involving corporations in Continental Europe. See Ann-
Kristin Achleitner et al., Private Equity Acquisitions of Continental European Firms: 
The Impact of Ownership and Control on the Likelihood of Being Taken Private, 19 
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 72, 73–74 (2013). 
 77. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
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monitor management.  In addition, the private equity investor will 
appoint its nominees to the company’s board of directors and obtain 
majority control.  The boards of private equity companies tend to be 
smaller and meet more frequently than those of public companies,78 and 
are thus considered to be more effective.  Unlike public boards, which 
are often preoccupied with governance and risk management, private 
equity boards are more focused on strategic leadership and value 
creation.79 
2. Operational Engineering 
In recent years, private equity firms have focused on what Steven 
Kaplan refers to as operational engineering.80  By applying industry and 
operating expertise, they strive to improve the operating performance of 
portfolio companies.  In order to achieve this improvement, private 
equity firms organize into industry groups and seek to recruit 
professionals with relevant operating and industry expertise. Indeed, 
these strategies have proven to be successful, as studies concerning 
different countries have found that buyouts result in significant 
operating improvements.81 
3. Tax Savings 
Apart from the beneficial use of debt in reducing agency costs 
associated with the use of free cash flow, debt also carries important tax 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. Francesca Cornelli & Oğuzhan Karakaş, Corporate Governance of LBOs: The 
Role of Boards 12 (May 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1875649. 
 79. Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity vs. PLC Boards in the U.K.: A 
Comparison of Practices and Effectiveness, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2009, at 45. 
 80. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 11. 
 81. In a study of U.S. public-to-private transactions during the 1980s, Kaplan 
found that the operating margin of portfolio companies increased by between 10% to 
20% and cash flow margin increased by almost 40%. See Steven Kaplan, The Effects of 
Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217 
(1989).  In addition, Harris et al., in their study of management buyouts in the U.K., 
show that private equity-backed companies experienced a substantial increase in total 
factor productivity after the buyout. See Richard Harris et al., Assessing the Impact of 
Management Buyouts on Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United 
Kingdom, 87 REV. ECON. STAT. 148 (2005). 
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benefits.  The tax deductibility of interest generates tax shields.  Kaplan 
shows that between 1980 and 1986, U.S. public-to-private transactions 
generated tax benefits equal to between 21% and 143% of the premium 
paid to pre-buyout shareholders. 82   LBOs have been particularly 
criticized for causing substantial tax losses to the state.  However, 
Jensen et al. examines the effects of buyouts on tax revenues of the U.S. 
Treasury and finds that buyouts actually result in increased tax 
revenues.83  
4. Wealth Expropriation from Other Stakeholders 
Shleifer and Summers famously argued that wealth gains caused by 
LBOs are attributable to the breach of implicit contracts between a 
corporation and its employees.84  Firms enter into implicit contracts with 
employees who, in exchange for lifetime employment, agree to lower 
wages.  The firm can profit by breaching these implicit contracts and 
firing workers.  LBOs have attracted strong criticism for reducing the 
number of employees in target companies.85  However, various studies 
suggest that the effect of LBOs on employment is minimal.  Davis et al. 
studied a sample of U.S. LBOs that took place between 1980 and 2005 
and found that employment levels in target firms declined after 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value, 
44 J. FIN. 611 (1989). 
 83. See Michael C. Jensen et al., Effects of LBOs on Taxes Revenues of the U.S. 
Treasury, 42 TAX NOTES 727 (1989).  The sources of increased tax revenues are the 
capital gains taxes imposed on pre-buyout shareholders, taxes on interest income earned 
by creditors financing the transaction, and capital gains taxes resulting from asset sales 
following the buyout.  Furthermore, LBO firms show an increase in operating income 
resulting in added tax revenues.  Moreover, LBOs eliminate wasteful capital 
expenditures.  The funds saved are returned to shareholders who can invest them in 
positive net present value projects, creating an additional source of tax revenues.  The 
resulting increased revenues offset the tax losses generated by interest deductions and 
reduced dividends. 
 84. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in   CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 53 (Alan J. 
Auerbach ed., 1988). 
 85. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., All the G.O.P.’s Gekkos, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2011, at A39, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/opinion/krugman-all-
the-gops-gekkos.html?_r=1. 
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buyouts.86  However, target companies rapidly created new jobs at new 
establishments, so that the overall net job losses were less than 1% of 
the initial employment levels.87  In another study concerning the impact 
of LBOs on employment in the U.K., Amess et al. found that private 
equity-backed acquisitions have no significant impact on wages and 
employment.88 
Another common explanation for the source of gains in private 
equity-backed acquisitions is that they expropriate value from pre-
buyout bondholders through a large increase in the debt of the target 
company.  However, the evidence does not support this view. Even 
though pre-existing bonds’ ratings are often downgraded after a 
leveraged buyout, the value of the bonds does not actually decrease.89 
II. THE FINANCING AND STRUCTURING OF PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE 
TRANSACTIONS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE 
A. SOME DIFFERENCES IN FINANCING PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS 
IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE 
1. The Certain Funds Requirement 
A public-to-private deal is mostly financed by debt.  A bank’s 
commitment to lend is usually made at the time the acquisition 
agreement is signed or the bid is launched, while the actual funding 
happens at the closing of the transaction.  This period between signing 
and closing can be particularly long, especially in cases where antitrust 
or other regulatory approvals are required.  The circumstances of a 
lender may thus change after a commitment to lend is made, which leads 
to heavy negotiations between lenders and borrowers about conditions 
                                                                                                                                         
 86. Steven J. Davis et al., Private Equity and Employment 31-34 (U.S. Census 
Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. CES-WP-08-07R, 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107175. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Kevin Amess et al., What are the Wage and Employment Consequences of 
Leveraged Buyouts, Private Equity and Acquisitions in the U.K.? 17 (Nottingham Univ. 
Bus. Sch. Research Paper Series No. 01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270581. 
 89. See Laurentius Marais, Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Wealth Effects of 
Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 155, 159 (1989).  
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precedent to funding. An essential difference between U.S. and 
European acquisition finance is the “certain funds” requirement 
prevalent in most European jurisdictions.  The purpose of the certain 
funds requirement is to preclude highly conditional and speculative 
offers.  The U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover 
Code”),90 which governs takeovers of U.K. public companies, was the 
first to introduce the certain funds requirement.  A majority of European 
jurisdictions have followed the U.K. approach and introduced the 
requirement as well.  General Principle 5 of the Takeover Code provides 
that “[a]n offeror must announce a bid only after ensuring that he/she 
can fulfill in full any cash consideration.”91  Accordingly, Rule 24.8 
provides that when an offer is for cash, 92  the offer document must 
include “confirmation” by the offeror’s bank or financial adviser that 
sufficient resources are available to the offeror to satisfy acceptance of 
the offer.93  Financial advisers will thus have to ascertain that the bidder 
has adequate cash to implement the offer. 
In order to satisfy the certain funds requirement, the lending bank 
cannot impose onerous funding conditions on the offeror to provide the 
bank an escape hatch to funding.  Yet, lenders are able to refuse the 
disbursement of funds for a limited set of conditions; current market 
practice is that lenders can deny funding only in cases of illegality or for 
matters that are solely within the control of the bidder.94  For instance, 
banks are not able to refuse the advancement of funds in the case of a 
“material[ly] adverse change in the target group.” 95   To satisfy the 
certain funds requirement, the bidder and the lender must enter into a 
signed loan agreement at the time the offer is announced or the 
agreement signed.96  Commitment letters or heads of terms agreements, 
                                                                                                                                         
 90. THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (10th ed. 2011) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf 
[hereinafter TAKEOVER CODE]. 
 91. Id. § B.5. 
 92. This is always the case in private equity acquisitions since the bidder will want 
to ensure that target shareholders do not participate in the post-acquisition company. 
 93. TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 90, at § I(24.8).  
 94. John D. Markland, How Certain Can You Get?, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, April 
2007. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See When Will a Commitment Letter Constitute a Firm Commitment? Some 
Thoughts on the Clear Channel Litigation from a U.K. Perspective, FINANCING 
BRIEFING (Slaughter & May), July 2008, at 1, 2. 
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which are commonplace in U.S. acquisition finance, will not suffice 
under the certain funds requirement. 
Banks in the U.S. are accustomed to insisting on a broad range of 
funding conditions as part of the negotiation between the lender and the 
acquirer.  Nonetheless, in recent years, U.S. banks have been “willing to 
provide more certain financing terms.”97 
The buyout of SunGard Data Systems significantly changed the 
structure of private equity deals.98  Under the SunGard approach, private 
equity bidders no longer have a financing condition in the purchase 
agreement, meaning they are obligated to fund the acquisition even if 
financing is not available.  However, purchasers now insist that the 
conditions to funding in the commitment letter are reciprocal to those in 
the acquisition agreement.  By aligning the conditions in the debt 
commitment letter with the ones in the acquisition agreement, the 
purchaser is protected from the possibility of having to complete the 
acquisition even though the lenders are excused from performance. 
The certain funds requirement imposed by European countries 
obligates banks to provide financing for a transaction, subject only to 
limited funding conditions.  As a result, banks are forced to bear the risk 
of market deterioration between the time that the acquisition agreement 
is signed or the offer launched, and the closing of the transaction.  
Therefore, banks are likely to demand compensation for this additional 
risk by charging a higher interest rate on the funds lent.  As a result, the 
transaction will have to be funded with more expensive debt, 
diminishing the returns of private equity bidders. 
2. Debt Subordination 
The financing package of a public-to-private transaction involves 
different types of debt.  A typical public-to-private transaction will be 
financed with senior bank debt, as well as one or both of mezzanine or 
high-yield debt.  Junior debt, namely mezzanine debt and high-yield, is 
subordinated to senior bank debt.  A crucial difference between U.S. and 
European acquisition finance is the means by which such subordination 
is achieved.  While subordination in the U.S. is achieved contractually, 
                                                                                                                                         
 97. David J. Sorkin & Eric M. Swedenburg, Recent U.S. Deals Depart from 
Traditional Financing, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 2006, at 103. 
 98. See Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, supra note 58, at 495. 
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uncertainty regarding the enforceability of contractual subordination in 
Europe has obliged legal practitioners to effect such subordination 
structurally. 
In a U.S. public-to-private deal, the various categories of debt are 
loaned to a single entity and debt holder priority is determined by an 
intercreditor agreement.  Α common subordination provision is the 
prohibition of payments to junior creditors in case of a payment default 
on senior debt.  Only once this payment default is cured or waived may 
the borrower resume making payments to junior creditors.  Furthermore, 
in case of any other breach of a senior obligation such as a breach of a 
covenant, the senior lenders have the right to prohibit the borrower from 
making any payments to junior creditors for a period of time, usually 
179 days. 99  Unless the senior creditors elect to accelerate their 
indebtedness, the issuer will resume payments on the bonds after the 
passage of this period of time. 
In Europe, subordination is achieved structurally.  Junior creditors 
will extend financing to a parent company with no assets other than 
shares in operating subsidiaries.  Senior lenders will make their loans to 
operating subsidiaries with title to business assets, and thus benefit from 
collateral on these assets.  As a result, if the parent and its subsidiaries 
both become insolvent, the junior creditors’ recovery will be limited to 
any amounts paid as distribution on the equity of the parent company.  
Junior creditors’ claims will be effectively subordinated to the senior 
lenders’ claims against the subsidiaries holding the underlying business 
assets.  A major shortcoming of structural subordination is the fact that 
junior creditors’ claims will also be subordinated to the claims of the 
subsidiary’s other creditors, such as trade creditors. 
Structural subordination of debt has given rise to one of the most 
rigorous debates in European acquisition finance.  In 2002, European 
high-yield investors threatened to boycott future high-yield debt 
offerings. 100   These investors felt vulnerable because of their weak 
bargaining position in case of insolvency, which was attributable to the 
structural subordination of their claims as well as weak recovery rates 
                                                                                                                                         
     99. William J. Wheelan, III, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics, in 
LEVERAGED FINANCIAL MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO HIGH-YIELD BONDS, 
LOANS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 171, 175 (William F. Maxwell & Mark R. Shenkman 
eds. 2010).  
   100.  Richard A. Ginsburg, European High Yield- Bondholder Insubordination, 
PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil, Gotshal & Manges), Apr. 2004, at 1. 
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on defaulted bonds.  This threat materialized in the 2003 high-yield 
offering for the acquisition of LeGrand, a French industrial group.101  
High-yield investors demanded guarantees from operating subsidiaries, 
and then boycotted the issue when the company rejected their demand.  
The issue was eventually brought to the market, but at a higher interest 
rate.  The LeGrand issue forced market participants to reevaluate the 
financing structure of European leveraged buyouts.  After LeGrand, 
granting credit support in the form of guarantees from the operating 
subsidiaries of the high-yield borrower became the norm in European 
high-yield issuances102 
The European market practice of structurally subordinating the 
claims of various debt categories requires specialist legal advice.  Such 
specialists would be expected to advise on the formation of different 
corporate entities, as well as complex negotiations between senior 
lenders and high-yield bondholders demanding credit support to 
improve their ranking in case of borrower insolvency.  As a result, 
significant transaction costs often arise for parties structuring private 
equity transactions in Europe. 
3. Ban on Financial Assistance 
The European Second Council Directive of December 13, 1976 
(“Second Directive”) 103  introduced the legal capital doctrine, the 
mandatory rules which seek to protect creditors from shareholder 
opportunism.104  The Second Directive obligates Member States of the 
European Union to impose a minimum capital requirement on 
companies, restrict shareholder distributions such as dividend payments 
and share-buybacks, and ban a target company from granting financial 
                                                                                                                                         
 101.  Bryant Edwards, Innovation Fuels Europe’s High-yield Market, INT’L FIN. L. 
REV. Mar. 2005, at 28, 31. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Second Council Directive 77/91,1976 O.J. (L 26) (EC) [hereinafter Second 
Council Directive]. 
 104. Shareholders may “benefit themselves at the expense of the creditors in a 
number of ways.” GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 48, at 116.  For example, they may 
withdraw assets from the firm by making distributions to themselves (asset diversion);  
authorize additional debt in such a way as to increase the risk profile of the firm and 
limit the pre-existing creditors’ recovery (claim dilution); or abandon projects with a 
positive net value that only benefit debt holders (underinvestment). See id. 
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assistance for the purpose of acquiring its own shares.105  The mandatory 
nature of the Second Directive is in sharp contrast to the U.S. approach 
to creditor protection.  In the U.S., creditors protect themselves from 
exploitation using contract law, not corporate law.106 
Article 23 of the Second Directive is of utmost importance for 
public-to-private transactions.  Article 23 prohibits public companies 
from granting financial assistance to third parties for the acquisition of 
the public companies’ shares, through the provision of loans or security 
over their assets.107  Some criticize this prohibition for impeding buyout 
transactions in situations where the bidder intends to use the target’s 
assets to secure debt necessary to finance the acquisition.  However, 
these financial assistance rules are designed to prevent asset-stripping 
takeovers and protect pre-existing creditors from the risks that LBOs 
pose by incurring additional debt. 108   Directive 2006/68/EC, which 
amended the Second Directive, relaxed the prohibition on financial 
assistance and permitted it subject to the fulfillment of certain 
requirements, such as the ex ante approval of the transaction by 
shareholders, the occurrence of the transaction at fair market conditions, 
and the investigation of the third party’s credit standing.109 However, 
                                                                                                                                         
 105. A detailed examination of the Second Directive is beyond the scope of this 
article. For an overview of the Directive and related criticism, see generally Luca 
Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditor Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against 
the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001). 
 106. See id. at 1173.  The U.S. approach can be seen as a manifestation of the 
contractual theory of the firm.  According to this prevalent American economic theory, 
the firm is viewed as a “nexus of contracts” among participants in the organization such 
as shareholders, employees, and creditors.  These participants should be allowed to 
structure their relations, as they desire. Mandatory rules are seen as an intrusion on the 
freedom to contract.  Thus, the state’s role should be limited to enforcing these 
contracts and providing default rules that the parties can alter. See generally R. H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 777 (1972); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996); Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature 
of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983). 
 107. See Second Council Directive 77/91, art. 23, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1, 8. 
 108. See John Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a 
Modern Company Law, 63 MOD. L. REV. 355, 368–69 (2000). 
  109. Council Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 September 2006 amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC regarding the formation 
of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, 
art. 1, 2006 O.J (L 264) 32, 33–35. 
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this relaxation has proven pointless, since a private equity bidder is still 
deterred by the costs and time associated with meeting these 
requirements. 
Despite the ban on financial assistance, Europe has seen a 
remarkable rise in LBO activity, indicating that the prohibition lacks 
bite. 110   In particular, when structuring private equity transactions, 
private equity bidders and target companies are able to exploit the fact 
that private companies are outside the reach of the ban.  Thus, the main 
technique developed to evade financial assistance rules in the U.K.111 
and Germany112 is to convert a public company into a private one before 
granting security over the target’s assets.  Nonetheless, certain national 
legislatures have extended the ban to cover private companies as well.  
Both Spain and Italy prohibit the granting of financial assistance by both 
public and private companies.113  As a result, private equity bidders in 
these countries rely on exemptions from merger restrictions in order to 
complete buyouts. 114   In Spain, scholars’ and practitioners’ opinions 
have spurred the development of an exemption for buyouts structured as 
mergers,115  while Italian legislators have introduced Article 2501 bis 
Cod. civ., which explicitly allows merger LBOs subject to the 
fulfillment of certain conditions.116  France, another important European 
private equity market, has adopted an absolute ban on financial 
                                                                                                                                         
 110. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are 
They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 39 (2006). 
 111. Pursuant to section 678 of the Companies Act of 2006, the law on financial 
assistance is applicable solely to public companies. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 
678 (U.K.). 
 112. The German Stock Corporation Act prohibits any form of financial assistance 
by the company to a third party for the purpose of acquiring shares in the company. See  
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 71(a) 
(Ger.), available at http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-
2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf.  A similar ban does not exist in case of 
German private limited companies (GmbH).  
 113. See Eilís Ferran, Regulation of Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout 
Activity in Europe 23 n.110 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 84, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=989748. 
 114. See id. at 23. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See Marco Silvestri, The New Italian Law on Merger Leveraged Buy-Outs: A 
Law and Economics Perspective, 6 EUR. BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 101, 111–12 
(2005). 
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assistance by both public and private companies. 117   There, private 
equity investors rely on post-acquisition dividends paid by the target in 
order to service the debt incurred to complete the buyout.118 
A similar ban on financial assistance does not exist in the U.S, 
where creditors are protected against opportunistic buyouts by federal 
and state fraudulent conveyance laws. 119   Following a wave of 
bankruptcies of companies that had been taken private during the 1980s, 
trustees representing the interests of creditors used fraudulent 
conveyance laws to invalidate these buyouts.120  The U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (“UFCA”), and its 
successor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), protect 
creditors against actual and constructive fraud on both federal and state 
levels.121  Due to the difficulty of proving intent to defraud, which is a 
necessary element of actual fraud, LBOs are usually attacked on the 
basis of constructive fraud.122 
For a court to determine that there has been constructive fraud, 
either the trustee in bankruptcy or the creditors must satisfy a two-
pronged test.  If the Bankruptcy Code or UFTA123  applies, the first 
prong requires the plaintiff to show that the transfer was not made for a 
reasonably equivalent value. 124   If the UFCA is invoked, the plaintiff 
must show that the transfer was not made for fair consideration. 125  In 
the context of a leveraged buyout, it can be argued that the target never 
received fair consideration or reasonably equivalent value, since the 
target provides security for the benefit of the lender, while the proceeds 
of the loan will pass to the target’s selling shareholders.  As a result, the 
target will have extended security over its assets without receiving 
anything in return.  The second prong requires the target company to be 
                                                                                                                                         
 117. See Ferran, supra note 113, at 24. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1495–96 (1987). 
 120. See Silvestri, supra note 116, at 118. 
 121. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act has been adopted by most U.S. states.  States that have not adopted a uniform act 
address fraudulent conveyance either in non-uniform statutes or common law. 
 122. Liss, supra note 119, at 1495–96. 
 123. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(2), 5(a) (1984) [hereinafter 
“U.F.T.A.”]. 
 124. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 125. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3 (1918) [“hereinafter U.F.C.A.”]. 
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one of the following: insolvent at the time of the transaction, rendered 
insolvent by the transaction,126 left with unreasonably small capital,127 or 
the debtor intended to incur, or believed he would incur, debts beyond 
his or her ability to pay (if the UFCA applies, the standard is ‘reasonably 
should have believed’).128  Once a court determines that there has been a 
fraudulent conveyance, the consequences can be severe.  For instance, 
the court can order the avoidance or subordination of the lender’s 
claims, the recovery from the lender of any loan repayments, and the 
recovery from the target’s old shareholders of any proceeds received 
from the sale of their stock to the private equity bidder.129 
When comparing the U.S. and E.U. approaches to LBOs, it 
becomes clear that there is a remarkable divergence.130  The E.U. adopts 
an ex ante general ban on LBOs, considering LBO transactions to be a 
form of financial assistance, while the U.S. prefers an ex post standard.  
In addition, legal intervention in the U.S. is exceptional in the sense that 
LBOs may be attacked on grounds of fraudulent conveyance only in 
cases of bankruptcy or insolvency.  Thus, parties structuring LBO 
transactions in Europe are faced with additional transaction costs 
generated by the E.U.-wide ban on financial assistance and the relevant 
rules promulgated by national legislatures.  Costly legal advice is 
necessary to ensure compliance with both national rules and local 
market practices.  In addition, the outright ban on financial assistance 
impedes the functioning of the market for corporate control131 and has an 
important signaling effect.  It signals European legislators’ hostility 
towards LBOs, which still have not gained the widespread acceptance 
that they enjoy in the U.S.132 
                                                                                                                                         
 126. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I); U.F.T.A. § 5(a); U.F.C.A. § 4. 
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II); U.F.C.A. § 5.  The applicable test under the 
U.F.T.A. is whether “the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in 
relation to the business or transaction.” U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(i). 
 128. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(B)(ii)(III); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(ii); UFCA § 6. 
  129. Robert A. Fogelson, Toward a Rational Theory of Fraudulent Conveyance 
Cases involving Leveraged Buyouts, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 552 (1993), 581-586.  
 130. See Silvestri, supra note 116, at 120. 
 131. Enriques & Macey, supra note 105, at 1197–98. 
 132. For instance, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark, 
openly criticized LBOs for saddling companies with debt and compromising workers’ 
rights.  See generally Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Taming the Private Equity ‘Locusts’, THE 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/10/ 
tamingtheprivateequitylo. 
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B. STRUCTURING PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS IN THE U.S. AND 
EUROPE 
1. Structuring Public-to-Private Transactions in the U.S. 
A public-to-private transaction in the U.S. can be structured as 
either a one-step merger or a tender offer133 followed by a back-end 
merger.134   In a one-step merger, also known as a long-form merger, 
section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) 
dictates that the board of directors of each corporation must approve the 
merger and submit the merger agreement to a stockholder vote.135  Prior 
to the shareholder meeting, a merger proxy must be submitted for 
review to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and once 
cleared, it is mailed to the shareholders. 136   Thus, the process to 
complete a one-step merger is particularly long and typically requires a 
period of between two and three months. 
A tender offer followed by a short-form merger is the quickest way 
for a private equity buyer to complete an acquisition. Pursuant to Rule 
14e-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, a tender offer must 
be open for at least 20 business days.137  If the bidder acquires more than 
90% of the target’s shares, it can effectuate a short-form merger138 and 
close the transaction in as few as 20 days.  However, if the acquirer fails 
                                                                                                                                         
 133. A tender offer is a public and open offer to all the shareholders of a public 
company to tender their shares for sale.  Tender offers are regulated by the Williams 
Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l–
78n (2006)), which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
 134. For the purpose of this article, we are assuming that both the bidder and the 
target are incorporated in Delaware, the preferred state of incorporation for the majority 
of U.S. public companies.  Delaware’s competitive advantages are a developed body of 
statutory law (The Delaware General Corporation Law), network and learning 
externalities flowing from wide use of Delaware corporate law, a highly specialized 
court system and Delaware’s commitment to shaping its law according to the needs of 
its corporations. See generally Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). 
 135. At least 51% of shareholders of both the acquirer and target must approve the 
transaction. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2010). 
 136. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3,   240.14a-6 (2012). 
 137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1. 
 138. According to section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a short-
form merger requires only a resolution of the board of directors of the acquirer.  A vote 
of the target shareholders or a resolution of the board of directors of the target company 
is not required. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (2010). 
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to reach the 90% threshold, the bidder will have to complete a back-end 
merger under section 251 of the DGCL and such timing benefits will be 
lost.  The latest innovation seeking to remedy this shortcoming is the 
top-up option, which is increasingly used.139  A top-up option gives the 
acquirer the right to purchase newly issued shares of the target upon 
receiving a certain minimum of the target’s shares (usually 51%) in a 
tender offer.  This allows the acquirer to obtain a 90% ownership stake, 
at which point it can complete a short-form merger. 
A major drawback of tender offers is the implication of the margin 
rules, which are regulations promulgated by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System.  Regulations U and X140 limit the ability of 
banks to extend financing for the purpose of acquiring margin stock 
secured directly or indirectly by the margin stock.141  The margin rules 
limit the amount banks can loan to 50% of the value of the collateral, 
namely the value of margin stock.  Nonetheless, these rules are not 
involved in either a one-step merger or a tender offer followed by a 
short-form merger.  In a one-step merger, the debt extended to finance 
the acquisition is secured by the target’s assets and not by margin stock.  
Furthermore, in a tender offer followed by a short-form merger, if the 
bidder acquires above 90% of the target’s stock and therefore is able to 
complete a short-form merger, the merger will happen at the same time 
as the conclusion of the tender offer.  Therefore, the loans will be 
considered secured by the target’s assets.  On the contrary, if the bidder 
does not succeed in obtaining 90% of the target’s stock and therefore 
cannot complete a short-form merger, the bidder will be required to 
perform a long-form back-end merger months after the front-end tender 
offer.  During that period, the only assets available to secure the loans 
will be the shares acquired in the tender offer, namely margin stock.  As 
a result, the financing will be limited to 50% of the value of that margin 
stock.  The margin rules have historically been a major impediment to 
structuring private equity transactions as tender offers. 
                                                                                                                                         
 139. Steven M. Davidoff, Behind the Growing Number of Tender Offers, 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 14, 2010, 3:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/behind-
the-growing-number-of tender-offers. 
 140. 12 C.F.R. §§ 221, 224 (2012). 
 141. Margin stock includes any security that is publicly-traded. 
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2. Structuring Public-to-Private Transactions in Europe 
The structure of public-to-private deals in Europe depends upon the 
mechanisms offered by the legal regimes of individual European 
countries.  The mergers and acquisitions landscape in Europe remains 
particularly fragmented, with considerable divergence between each 
nation’s rules.  Differing national rules necessitate extensive and costly 
legal advice by local lawyers.  Such transaction costs for private equity 
bidders inhibit the creation of a Pan-European buyout market. 
a. Merger Structures in Europe 
It is common for all European countries to offer a framework for 
carrying out a merger.  Nonetheless, European countries impose certain 
onerous requirements, making this structure particularly unattractive for 
parties involved in a public-to-private transaction.  This is in contrast to 
Delaware, which offers a relatively straightforward and simple 
procedure for effecting mergers tailored to the needs of private equity 
bidders.  Our discussion relating to the relevant rules will be limited to 
the U.K., Germany, and France, which account for the majority of 
private equity activity in Europe. 
In the U.K., private equity bidders utilize a form of corporate 
reconstruction known as a “scheme of arrangement.”142  Schemes of 
arrangements in private equity transactions are structured as 
“cancellation schemes” in which the target cancels all of its issued 
shares and new shares are issued to the private equity bidder.143  Target 
shareholders then receive cash in exchange for their cancelled shares.  
Such a scheme requires the approval of 75% of target shareholders in 
value with a majority of the shareholders present and voting at the 
                                                                                                                                         
 142. A “scheme of arrangement” resembles a merger structure in the sense that it 
allows a bidder to obtain full control of the target company. See Scheme of 
Arrangement, Practical Law Company (2013), http://uk.practicallaw.com/0-107-7201. 
The provisions for completing a scheme of arrangement are found in Part 26 of the 
Companies Act of 2006.  The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, is the main statute that 
regulates U.K. public and private companies. 
 143. A “cancellation scheme” involves a reduction of capital and therefore requires 
the target to comply with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2006.  
According to the Companies Act 2006, a reduction of capital requires a shareholder 
resolution and a court order. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 645–649.  
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meeting, 144  and must additionally be sanctioned by the court. 145  
Schemes of arrangement are beneficial due to their binding effect on 
shareholders who voted against the scheme or abstained from voting, 
allowing the private equity investor to obtain full control of the target.  
However, the high shareholder approval threshold and the requirement 
for sanction by a court create considerable uncertainty to the 
consummation of the transaction. 
German law also provides for a statutory merger procedure 
(Verschmelzung).  In a German statutory merger,146 the shareholders of 
the target company merging into the private equity acquirer receive 
shares from the bidder in exchange for their own shares.  A court-
appointed auditor must examine the adequacy of the exchange ratio.147  
The shareholders of both the acquirer and target company, representing 
at least 75% of the share capital present, must approve the merger.148  
The statutory merger takes effect upon the filing of the merger 
resolutions with the companies’ registrars. 149  Shareholders may 
challenge the merger resolution and thereby block the entry of the 
resolution in the register.150  In addition, creditors may demand security 
from the surviving company for any debts that are insufficiently 
backed. 151   Statutory mergers are rarely used in private equity 
transactions, mainly because the private equity bidder will not want 
target shareholders to be part of the post-acquisition company.  
Furthermore, the aforementioned shareholder and creditor rights 
                                                                                                                                         
 144. Id. § 899(1). The shareholders’ meeting requires a court order in order to be 
convened. See id. § 896. 
 145. Id. § 899(2).  The court will sanction the scheme after determining that the 
statutory scheme has been adhered to, the meeting has been held properly and the 
proposal for the scheme submitted to the shareholders is such that an intelligent and 
honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might 
reasonably approve. See Re Nat’l Bank Ltd., [1966] 1 W.L.R. 819 (Eng.). 
 146. The statutory merger is regulated by the German Transformation (or 
Reorganization) Act (Umwaldungsgesetz or UmwG). See Umwaldungsgesetz [UmwG] 
[Transformation Act], Oct. 28, 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] I (Ger.). 
 147. Id. at 3210, §§ 9–12, 60. 
 148. Id. § 65(1). 
  149. Id § 16(1). The commercial register is the German public authority responsible 
for approving the incorporation and keeping a registry of all companies incorporated in 
its territory.  
 150. Id. § 14. 
 151. Id. § 22. 
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introduce an element of legal uncertainty, which is unacceptable for 
private equity bidders eager to quickly complete acquisitions of 
promising companies. 
A unique feature of the German legal system is the domination and 
profit or loss transfer agreement.152  Under this agreement, one company 
(the dominated company) submits itself to the direction of another 
company (the dominating company).  The dominating company may 
give legally binding instructions to the dominated company.153   The 
dominated company’s profits are transferred to the dominating 
company, but the dominating company must compensate the dominated 
company for any annual losses.154   A domination and profit or loss 
transfer agreement must be approved by 75% of the dominated 
company’s shareholders. 155   If the dominating company is a public 
company, an approval by a similar majority is required.156 
In the German private equity market, a bidder will first launch a 
public takeover offer for all of the target company’s shares.  After the 
bidder succeeds in acquiring 75% of the target’s shares, they can vote in 
favor of the domination and profit and loss agreement.  However, to 
protect the dominated company’s minority shareholders from 
exploitation, German law requires the dominating company to offer to 
acquire its own shares at fair market value as well as guarantee a 
minimum dividend to minority shareholders who elect to stay in the 
dominated company and not tender their shares.157 
In France, the legal system offers a statutory merger procedure 
known as a fusion.158  A French statutory merger involves an exchange 
of shares whereby target shareholders exchange their own shares for 
                                                                                                                                         
 152. A domination and profit or loss transfer agreement resembles a merger 
procedure insofar as it allows the bidder to obtain complete control of the target.  It is 
widely used in private quity transactions.  For example, Blackstone Group employed a 
domination and profit or loss transfer agreement in its buyout of Celanese. 
 153. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, 
§ 291(1) (Ger.), available at http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-
corporation-act-2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. § 293(1). 
 156. Id. § 293(2). 
 157. Id. §§ 304, 305. 
 158. Statutory mergers (fusions) between public companies incorporated in France 
(denoted by the label “S.A.”) are regulated by arts. L.236-8 to 236-22 of the French 
Commercial Code, Code de Commerce. 
648 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
shares in the bidder. 159   As mentioned above, this requirement is 
particularly unattractive for private equity acquirers.  Furthermore, both 
the bidder’s and target’s shareholders must approve the merger by a 
majority vote of 75%. 160   Additionally, French law requires the 
appointment of one or several merger auditors (commissaires à la 
fusion), designated by the Chief Judge of the Commercial Court, who 
ensure that the valuation of the relevant companies’ shares is appropriate 
and the exchange ratio is fair.161  Creditors of both companies can also 
oppose the merger plan in a court proceeding.  The Commercial Court 
may approve or reject the opposition.  However, even in the case that 
the opposition is rejected and the merger is allowed to proceed, the court 
can  order the repayment of the debt or the constitution of guarantees, if 
offered by the absorbing company.  The strictness of the French law 
governing statutory mergers can be seen as a manifestation of the heavy-
handed social control over business that characterizes the French legal 
system.162 
b. Takeover Offers in Europe 
The takeover offer is an alternative mechanism that is widely used 
by private equity bidders in order to complete public-to-private deals in 
Europe.  In a private equity transaction, the bidder will typically launch 
a voluntary takeover offer for all the shares of the target company.   
Since a bidder rarely succeeds in obtaining 100% of the target’s share 
capital, it will attempt a statutory procedure called a “squeeze-out”.163  
In a squeeze out, the bidders seek to acquire enough shares to meet the 
threshold required by national rules, at which point the bidder can force 
the minority shareholders to sell their shares. 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. These are known as statutory mergers by absorption (fusion-absorption). 
 160. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.236-9 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations. 
 161. C. COM. art. L.236-10. 
 162. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 285, 307 (2008). 
 163. The term “squeeze-out” refers to a statutory procedure whereby a bidder who 
has acquired a certain percentage of shares (the relevant percentage varies between 
Member States) is able to require the remaining minority shareholders to sell their 
shares in return for consideration. 
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A major impediment to private equity bidders structuring deals as 
takeover offers is the divergence of national takeover regimes within the 
European Union.  In an effort to create a harmonized takeover regime, 
lower the costs of takeovers, and promote takeover activity in the 
European Union, the E.U. adopted Directive 2004/25/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of April 21, 2004, on takeover 
bids (“Takeover Directive”).164  The legislative process lasted fifteen 
years and was marked by heated negotiations and intense lobbying of 
individual European countries.165  This was especially true for Germany, 
which viewed the liberal takeover regime promoted by the Takeover 
Directive as a threat to its closed and consensual corporate system, 
commonly referred to as Deutschland AG.166  The resulting Directive 
establishes a common framework for takeover bids in the E.U. and sets 
minimum requirements that must be followed by individual Member 
States.  The relevant rules apply to takeover offers167 for shares of listed 
companies.168 
The Takeover Directive requires bidders to announce their decision 
to make a bid without delay and to prepare an offer document containing 
enhanced disclosures that will be made publicly available.  This 
promotes market transparency and enables target shareholders to make 
                                                                                                                                         
 164. Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. 
 165. Nigel Waddington, The Europeanisation of Corporate Governance in Germany 
and the U.K. 14 (June 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/6119/. 
 166. Id. 
 167. According to article 2(1)(a) of the Takeover Directive, a takeover bid is defined 
as “a public offer . . . made to the holders of the securities of a company to acquire all 
or some of those securities, whether mandatory or voluntary, which follows or has as its 
objective the acquisition of control of the offeree company in accordance with national 
law.” Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 2(1)(a), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 15 
(EC). 
 168. Since the Directive establishes only minimum requirements, Member States are 
allowed to introduce more stringent provisions. Id., art. 3(2), at 16.  Additionally, 
Member States are able to extend the application of their national takeover legislation to 
non-listed companies.  A prominent example is the U.K. Takeover Code, which applies 
to takeovers for both listed and non-listed public companies.  Subject to certain 
conditions being fulfilled, the Takeover Code also applies to private companies.   See 
TAKEOVER CODE, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/download-
code. 
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informed decisions.169  The target board should also prepare a public 
document setting forth its opinion on the bid. 170   All of the target 
company’s shareholders must be treated equally 171  and offered the 
highest offer price.172  Furthermore, in order to allow target shareholders 
to properly evaluate the takeover offer, Member States are required to 
provide a sufficient time period for the acceptance of the bid, ranging 
from two to ten weeks.173  By setting a floor on the acceptance period, 
the Takeover Directive protects target shareholders from so-called 
“Saturday Night Specials.”174 
The most innovative and controversial rules of the Takeover 
Directive are the mandatory bid rule, the board neutrality rule, the 
break-through rule, and squeeze-out and sell-out rights.  The mandatory 
bid rule obligates a bidder who acquires a specified percentage of voting 
rights in a target company, and is granted control over that company, to 
make an offer to purchase the entire company at an equitable price.175  
Thus, bidders are prevented from launching highly coercive partial bids 
and front-end loaded bids.176   In addition, the rule protects minority 
shareholders by ensuring that they will share any control premium along 
with any controlling shareholder that sells his stake.  Member States are 
                                                                                                                                         
 169.  Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, arts. 6(2), 8, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 
18–19 (EC). 
 170. Id., art. 9(5), at 19. 
 171. Id., art. 3(1)(a), at 15. 
 172. Id., art. 5(4), at 17. 
 173. Id., art. 7, at 18. 
 174. A “Saturday Night Special” is a coercive takeover offer open for a very short 
period of time, usually a few days.  Target shareholders are pressured to quickly accept 
or decline the offer without having sufficient time to properly evaluate it.  This 
technique was widely used in the U.S. in the early 1970s. 
 175.  Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 5(1), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 17 
(EC). 
 176. In a partial bid, target shareholders will be pressured to tender their shares out 
of fear that they will be left with low value minority shares in a company controlled by 
a new shareholder.  A “front-end loaded” bid creates the same pressure for shareholders 
to tender their shares.  In a “front-end loaded” bid, the bidder will launch an initial 
partial bid at a high premium in order to gain effective control of the target company 
and will simultaneously indicate its intention to launch a “back-end” offer for the 
remaining shares at a reduced price.  Therefore, shareholders are pressured to tender 
their shares at the initial bid even if they view the rejection of the bid as the value-
maximizing choice. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An 
Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987). 
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responsible for determining the requisite percentage of voting rights that 
triggers a mandatory bid.  Another area where discretion is afforded to 
Member States is the ability to waive the application of the mandatory 
bid rule in individual cases.177 
In contrast with the U.S. approach that provides management with 
broad latitude to defend against takeovers, the Takeover Directive, 
incorporating the principle of shareholder choice, prohibits target 
management from erecting pre- or post-bid takeover defenses. 178  The 
board neutrality rule prevents the board of the target company from 
taking any action to frustrate a takeover bid without prior shareholder 
approval.179  Article 11 of the Takeover Directive introduces the break-
through rule that neutralizes vis-à-vis a bidder certain takeover defenses 
installed prior to the launch of a takeover offer, such as restrictions on 
the transfer of shares, voting caps, and multiple voting shares.  
Nevertheless, the impact of both of these rules is weakened by Article 
12 of the Takeover Directive, which makes the implementation of 
Articles 9 and 11 optional by giving Member States the power to opt out 
of these rules. 180 
  In order to protect a majority shareholder from the opportunistic 
behavior of minority shareholders, Article 16 of the Takeover Directive 
allows a majority shareholder who has acquired between 90% and 95% 
of the capital carrying voting shares to obligate minority shareholders to 
sell their shares at the price offered in the preceding takeover offer.181  
The squeeze-out right makes takeover offers more attractive by enabling 
a successful bidder to fully integrate the target into its operations.  This 
procedure is widely used by private equity bidders, who seek to obtain 
full control of the target company.  On the other hand, the sell-out right 
introduced by Article 15 of the Takeover Directive protects a minority 
shareholder from being exploited by a controlling shareholder by 
providing him a put option to sell his shares to the controlling 
shareholders. 182 The relevant thresholds and price to be offered mirror 
the ones applicable in the case of a squeeze-out.  
                                                                                                                                         
 177.  Directive 2004/25, art. 4(5), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 17 (EC). 
 178. Id., art. 9, at 19. 
 179. Id. 
  180. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 21 
(EC). 
  181. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 16, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 22 
(EC).  The relevant threshold is to be determined by individual Member States. 
 182. Id.  art. 15, at 22.  
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Overall, even after the adoption and implementation of the 
Takeover Directive, a truly harmonized Pan-European takeover regime 
is still far from becoming a reality.  European legislators prefer 
minimum harmonization, thus allowing Member States to impose more 
stringent and extensive provisions than the ones found in the Takeover 
Directive. Nevertheless, the harmonization of the rules governing the 
organization of takeover offers, such as the requirement for enhanced 
disclosures to target shareholders and the minimum acceptance period, 
is a particularly welcome development in line with the European 
Union’s goal of promoting takeover activity.  On the other hand, the 
optionality arrangement allowing Member States to avoid the 
application of the board neutrality and break-through rules does little to 
facilitate and promote cross-border takeover activity. In fact, the 
European Commission has acknowledged the reluctance of Member 
States to lift takeover barriers.183 
As a result of the minimum harmonization strategy adopted by 
European legislators, the Member States’ takeover regimes show 
considerable variability, in line with the differing stages of development 
of each country’s takeover market.  For instance, the Takeover Code’s 
specialized provisions for management buyouts 184  reflect the 
sophistication of the U.K.’s takeover market, which has traditionally 
been the most developed in Europe.  Furthermore, the framework nature 
of the Takeover Directive—where the EU sets minimum standards—
allows individual Member States to introduce more stringent 
requirements when implementing the relevant rules.  For example, 
Article 9(5) of the Takeover Directive requires a target company’s board 
of directors to publish its opinion of the bid, the impact it will have on 
the company’s interests (specifically employees), and the bidder’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 183. Only three out of twenty-five Member States have introduced the break-
through rule into their national legislation. See generally Commission Report on the 
Implementation of The Directive on Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268 final (Feb. 21, 
2007). 
 184. See, e.g., TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 3.1, at D20 (stressing the importance of 
independent advice to the board of the offeree company in case of a management 
buyout); Rule 20.3, at I12 (requiring the private equity bidder to disclose to the target 
board all the information that is furnished to external providers of finance for the 
transaction).   
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strategic plans for the company.185  The vague and open-ended nature of 
the provision is a perfect example of the EU’s minimum harmonization 
strategy, which grants Member States wide discretion in implementing 
the provision.  Contrasting the ways in which Germany and the U.K. 
have implemented the abovementioned article illustrates the EU’s 
minimum harmonization strategy.  Section 27 of the German Securities 
Acquisition and Takeover Act, 186  which governs takeover offers for 
listed companies, requires the target board’s statement to describe the 
type and amount of consideration offered, the objectives of the bidder, 
the consequences of a successful bid for the target company and its 
employees, and the intention of the target board members with regards 
to accepting the offer if they hold securities in the target.  On the 
contrary, Rule 25 of the Takeover Code contains more extensive 
information requirements on the part of the target’s board including 
details of any securities held by the target or its directors in the bidder,187 
service contracts between any director of the target with the company,188 
and the fees and expenses that the target will incur in relation to the 
offer.189  
Another example is the implementation of the squeeze-out 
procedure in the laws of Member States.  As mentioned above, the 
Takeover Directive provides individual Member States with the 
opportunity to set a threshold above which a majority shareholder may 
exercise the right to squeeze-out minority shareholders, provided that it 
is between 90% and 95% of the voting shares.  While the relevant 
threshold in France is set at 95% of the voting shares, in Spain, a 
controlling shareholder who has acquired only 90% may effectuate a 
squeeze-out. 190 In addition, certain Member States, such as Germany, 
have introduced more stringent requirements for completing a squeeze-
out of minority shareholders by requiring court approval.191 
                                                                                                                                         
 185. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, art. 9(5), 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 18–
19 (EC). 
 186. Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz [WpÜG] [Securities Acquisition 
and Takeover Act], Dec. 20, 2001, BGBL. I at 3822, § 27 (Ger.). 
 187. TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 25.4, at J19. 
 188. Id., Rule 25.5, at J21. 
  189.  Id., Rule 25.8, at J23.  
  190. BONELLI EREDE PAPPALARDO ET AL., GUIDE TO PUBLIC TAKEOVERS IN EUROPE 
(2013) at 325, 335, available at http://www.debrauw.com/News/Publications/Pages/ 
GuidetoPublicTakeoversinEurope.aspx.  
 191. Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act § 39a (Ger.). 
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Thus, despite the adoption of the Takeover Directive, a Pan-
European takeover market is still far from a reality.  Private equity 
bidders structuring buyouts are left to deal with a variety of supervisory 
authorities and local rules.  Local lawyers need legal advice from 
specialists, thereby raising transactions.  One should contrast European 
takeover regulations with the U.S. model, where the Williams Act 
regulates tender offers on a federal level without the involvement of 
U.S. states.  Although the conduct of the board of directors in the U.S. 
takeover context is regulated on a state level, the laws of Delaware are 
widespread as it is the preferred state of incorporation for U.S. public 
companies.  As a result, the U.S. has effectively adopted a unified and 
coherent takeover regime, providing certainty to parties structuring 
buyouts. 
III. AFTER THE CRISIS: THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND 
MANAGERS DIRECTIVE AND THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
Politicians and the public on both sides of the Atlantic regularly 
criticize the private equity industry—commonly viewed as the dark side 
of capitalism—for slashing jobs, breaking up companies, and pressuring 
them to focus on short-term results instead of long-term growth.192  The 
Financial Crisis was the perfect opportunity for politicians to fulfill their 
desire to regulate the private equity industry.  The AIFM Directive and 
the Dodd-Frank Act, both adopted in the aftermath of the crisis, contain 
provisions directly aimed at private equity.  While the AIFM Directive 
solely targets the alternative investment fund industry, the ambit of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is much broader.  As Skeel notes, the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s objectives are twofold: “[i]ts first objective is to limit the risk of 
contemporary finance . . . ; and the second is to limit the damage caused 
by the failure of a large financial institution.”193  The provisions relating 
to the regulation of private equity funds can be seen as fulfilling the first 
objective. 
                                                                                                                                         
  192. Rasmussen, supra note 132.  
 193. DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 4 (2010). 
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A. AIFM DIRECTIVE 
The AIFM Directive, adopted in November 2010, was one of the 
most controversial and hotly debated pieces of legislation in European 
legislative history.  Calls to regulate the alternative investment fund 
industry were common even before the Financial Crisis. Within Europe, 
the European Parliament was one of the most prominent institutions to 
criticize the industry.  The Parliament adopted various resolutions 
calling upon the Commission to examine the industry’s potential 
negative effects. 194   Furthermore, the Parliamentary Socialist Group, 
traditionally hostile to Anglo-Saxon capitalism, published a report in 
March, 2007 highlighting the detrimental effects of private equity and 
hedge funds and the need for tight regulation.195  The overall sentiment 
in favor of regulation was supported by public criticism of hedge funds 
and private equity tactics by politicians of individual Member States.196  
The Financial Crisis, regarded as a crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, 
was the ideal opportunity for Germany and France, the main proponents 
of stricter regulation, to put forward their own agenda.  They did so 
despite resistance from the U.K., which viewed the AIFM Directive as a 
threat to London’s prominence as a center for hedge funds and buy-out 
firms operating in Europe.197  The final version of the AIFM Directive 
was adopted after eighteen months of intense lobbying and heated 
negotiations.198 
The main goal of the AIFM Directive is to create a harmonized 
regulatory and supervisory framework for alternative investment fund 
                                                                                                                                         
 194. See generally European Parliament Resolution on the Future of Hedge Funds 
and Derivatives, P5_TA(2004)0031; European Parliament Resolution on Asset 
Management, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0181. 
 195. IEKE VAN DEN BURG & POUL NYRUP RASMUSSEN, PSE, SOCIALIST GROUP OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS (2007). 
 196. For instance, Guilio Tremonti, the Italian Finance Minister described hedge 
funds as “hellish” and demanded their abolishment. See Tracy Corrigan, Hedge Funds 
Don’t Need Punishing – They are Suffering Enough, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Oct. 16, 
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/tracycorrigan/3212102/Hedge-
funds-dont-need-punishing-they-are-suffering-enough.html. 
 197. Elena Moya, City Lobbying Helps Water Down European Hedge Fund 
Legislation Plans, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 27, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
business/2009/jul/27/hedge-funds-european-directive. 
 198. Eilís Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 379, 398 (2011). 
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managers (“AIFMs”) and promote an internal market for their activities.  
The need for regulation was premised on the perceived lack of 
transparency in the industry and the systemic risk that this posed to the 
financial system.199  The scope of the AIFM Directive is broad; it covers 
alternative investment fund managers established in the E.U. that 
manage alternative investment funds (“AIFs”), whether EU-based or 
not, and non-E.U. based AIFMs that manage and/or market one or more 
AIFs in the EU. 200  An AIFM is defined as “[any] legal person[] whose 
regular business is managing one or more AIFs.”201  As a result, the 
AIFM Directive covers a broad array of AIFMs that includes managers 
of private equity funds, hedge funds, commodity funds, and real estate 
funds. 
 AIFMs covered by the AIFM Directive must receive authorization 
from the competent authorities of their home Member States.202  The 
Directive grants an exemption to AIFMs managing AIFs whose assets 
under management do not exceed €100 million. 203   It also exempts 
AIFMs managing unleveraged AIFs that grant investors no redemption 
rights for a period of five years and whose assets do not exceed €500 
million.204  These thresholds have been heavily criticized as being too 
low, thus extending the application of the Directive to AIFMs that pose 
                                                                                                                                         
 199. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 
2009/65/EC, at 2–3 (COM) (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009). 
 200. Directive 2011/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC 
and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 
Preamble, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 3 [hereinafter AIFM Directive]. 
 201. Id., art. 4(1)(b).  Pursuant to Article 4(1)(a), an AIF is defined as any collective 
investment undertaking that “raise[s] capital from a number of investors with a view to 
investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those 
investors” and which “do[es] not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of 
Directive 2009/65/EC” (commonly known as “UCITS” Directive). 
 202. Id., art. 7. 
 203. Id., art. 3(2).  The second exemption has in essence been created for private 
equity firms.  One should note that the AIFMs exempted are still required to register 
with the competent authorities of their home Member State and provide information on 
the main instruments on which they are trading and their investment strategies. See id., 
art. 3(3). 
 204. Id. 
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no systemic threat to the financial system.205  Additionally, the AIFM 
Directive imposes minimum capital requirements on AIFMs 206  and 
requires them to devise and maintain appropriate liquidity207 and risk 
management systems,208 remuneration policies that discourage excessive 
risk-taking,209 and systems for identifying and managing any conflicts of 
interests.210  AIFMs must also ensure that a depository is appointed for 
each AIF under management211 and that each of AIF’s assets are valued 
at least once per year.212 
In addition, the AIFM Directive imposes wide-ranging 
transparency and disclosure obligations.  AIFMs must make available to 
their supervisory authority and, on request, to investors, an audited 
annual report with respect to each E.U. fund managed by and marketed 
in the EU.213  Additionally, Article 24 of the AIFM Directive requires 
fund managers to regularly report to their supervisory authorities on 
matters such as the principal markets in which they trade, the main 
exposures of each fund they manage, and the main asset classes in 
which a fund is invests. 214   AIFMs must also ensure that certain 
information is made available to investors prior to their investment in a 
fund and periodically thereafter.215 
The AIFM Directive includes provisions aimed directly at LBOs of 
E.U.-listed and non-listed companies.  AIFMs managing AIFs that 
acquire voting rights reaching, exceeding or falling below certain 
thresholds (starting at 10%) must notify their appropriate authorities.216  
In addition, once an AIF acquires control of a non-listed company, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 205. According to the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, 
private equity firms below €1 billion that provide financing to small and medium-sized 
firms and operate on a regional, local or national level pose no threat to financial 
stability.  See EUR. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL INDUS., RESPONSE TO THE 
PROPOSED DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL ON ALTERNATIVE 
INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS (AIFM) 3 (2009). 
 206. AIFM Directive, art. 9, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 22. 
 207. Id., art. 16. 
 208. Id., art. 15. 
 209. Id., art. 13. 
 210. Id., art. 14. 
 211. Id., art. 21. 
 212. Id., art. 19. 
 213. Id., art. 22. 
 214. Id., art. 24. 
 215. Id., art. 23. 
 216. Id., art. 27(1). 
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fund manager must notify its supervisory authority, the non-listed 
company, and its shareholders of the acquisition.217  Article 28 imposes 
additional disclosure requirements once control of a listed or non-listed 
company is acquired.  In particular, the AIFM managing the AIF that 
obtains control over the company shall make its identity, as well as its 
policy for managing any resulting conflicts of interest, available to the 
supervisory authority and the company.218  The annual report of a non-
listed company controlled by an AIF, as well as the report of the AIF 
itself, must also contain a fair review of the company’s past and future 
business development.219  Additionally, the AIF must make available to 
the relevant authorities information regarding the financing of an 
acquisition of a non-listed company. 220   Article 30 is a particularly 
interventionist provision.  This provision prevents an AIFM, managing 
an AIF that acquires control of a listed or non-listed company, from 
facilitating, supporting, instructing, or voting in favor of any 
distribution, capital reduction, share redemption, or share buyback for a 
period of two years following the acquisition of control.221 
 A positive aspect of the AIFM Directive is the creation of an 
internal market for alternative investment funds.  E.U.-based AIFMs are 
allowed to market E.U. AIFs with a passport across the Union. 222  
However, non-E.U. based AIFMs marketing AIFs (E.U. based or not) 
and E.U. based AIFs marketing non-E.U.  AIFs must market funds 
according to national private placement regimes until the European 
Commission allows the extension of the passporting provisions which is 
expected to take effect in 2015.223 
 Overall, the AIFM Directive has been criticized as being an “odd, 
political piece of law making.” 224   The main target of European 
                                                                                                                                         
 217. Id., art. 27(2)–(3). 
 218. Id., art. 28(1)–(2). 
 219. Id., art. 29. 
 220. Id., art. 28(5). 
 221. Id., art. 30.  This restriction is subject to the qualification that payments out of 
distributable profits are allowed but only when such payments do not cause the 
company’s net assets to fall below the level of subscribed capital plus non-distributable 
reserves. 
 222. Id., art. 32. 
  223. Id., arts. 35–42 & 67(6). 
 224. Walter R. Henle & Allan Murry-Jones, Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (Skadden, Arps, Meagher, Slate & Flom LLP), Nov. 29, 2010. 
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legislators was the hedge fund industry, with private equity being swept 
along as well.225  The rationales underpinning the adoption of the AIFM 
Directive—namely the need to tackle systemic risk and increase the 
transparency of the industry—are unsound reasons for regulating private 
equity.  The private equity industry is unlikely to be a source of systemic 
risk,226 and therefore obligating disclosures to supervisory authorities 
makes little sense. 227   An important concern is the effect that a 
widespread failure of private equity-backed companies would have on 
the banking system, which finances LBO deals.  Nevertheless, even the 
European Central Bank has acknowledged that LBO activity poses little 
systemic risk to the banking sector.228  Furthermore, assuming that a 
danger does exist, the best course of action would be to directly regulate 
the banking sector, which was the main contributor to the LBO boom 
through its extension of cheap financing to private equity buyers.229  In 
addition to necessitating enhanced disclosures to supervisors, the AIFM 
Directive also requires that substantial disclosures be made to investors.  
However, investors in private equity funds are sophisticated and capable 
of demanding this information in an arm’s length bargain.230 
The valuation and depository requirements also add undue costs on 
the private equity industry.  Valuation requirements make little sense in 
the private equity context.  Distributions to investors are made upon 
liquidation of the investments via an initial public offering (“IPO”), 
secondary sale, or trade sale, which provides an objective third party 
valuation.231  The use of depositories is intended to prevent Madoff-style 
frauds. However, as Dan Awrey notes, “[t]he long term, illiquid and 
typically very public nature of the investments made by these 
                                                                                                                                         
 225. Payne, supra note 17, at 582. 
 226. Indeed, private equity neither contributed to nor caused the recent financial 
crisis and there was no widespread failure of private equity-backed companies. 
 227. Payne, supra note 17, at 584. 
 228. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, LARGE BANKS AND PRIVATE EQUITY-SPONSORED 
LEVERAGE BUYOUTS IN THE EU (Apr. 2007). 
 229. Shasha Dai, The Inner Circle of Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J. PRIVATE EQUITY 
BLOG, (Mar. 10, 2009, 5:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/03/10/the-
inner-circle-of-systemic-risk/. 
 230. Indeed, disclosures to funds’ investors have generally been found to be 
adequate.  See generally DAVID WALKER, DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATE 
EQUITY: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT JULY 2007 (2007). 
 231. Dan Awrey, The Limits of E.U. Hedge Fund Regulation, 20 (Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 8.2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757719. 
660 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
institutions virtually eliminates the potential for Madoff-type fraud.”232  
Furthermore, the disclosure provisions aimed at LBOs have been 
criticized for putting private equity investors at a competitive 
disadvantage to other investors such as sovereign wealth funds, 
foundations, and pension funds, which fall outside the ambit of the 
AIFM Directive. 
The AIFM Directive imposes significant and undue costs on the 
private equity industry.  It has been estimated that the sum of one-time 
and ongoing costs amount to € 1 billion.233  For example, private equity 
firms may decide to exit the European market, depriving European 
investors of the opportunity to invest in private equity and lowering the 
competitiveness of the European economy.  On the flip side, the firms 
which decide to continue operating in Europe and marketing their funds 
to E.U. investors will face higher costs that will be passed on to 
investors in the form of higher fees and lower returns. 
B. THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 The Dodd-Frank Act is the first attempt in the U.S. to directly 
regulate the private equity industry.  Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act234 
forces the traditionally secretive private equity industry to disclose 
information about its operations to regulators and the investing public.  
Thus, regulators are able to monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the 
financial system.  In addition, the Volcker Rule, found in section 619 of 
the Act, prohibits banking entities from sponsoring or retaining any 
equity, partnership or other ownership interest in a private equity fund, 
subject to certain exceptions.235   The aim of the Volcker Rule is to 
reduce excessive risk taking by the banking sector and to prohibit 
banking entities from benefiting from government support for their 
speculation at the expense of taxpayers and depositors.236 
                                                                                                                                         
 232. Id. at 19. 
 233. KYLA MALCOLM ET AL., CHARLES RIVERS ASSOCIATES, IMPACT OF THE 
PROPOSED AIFM DIRECTIVE ACROSS EUROPE 112–13 (2009). 
 234. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, art. IV, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 235. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(a)(1)(B).  
 236. The Volcker Rule is also applicable to non-bank financial companies 
supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve that engage in the above 
mentioned activities.  Instead of prohibiting these entities from sponsoring or investing 
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Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act repeals section 203(b)(3) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), thereby requiring 
fund managers to register as investment advisers.  Section 203(b)(3) 
previously allowed fund managers who did not hold themselves out as 
investment advisors to the general public and had fewer than fifteen 
clients over a twelve-month period to avoid registration with the SEC.  
As a result, private equity fund managers controlling assets above 
certain thresholds237 will be subject to enhanced disclosure requirements.  
Fund managers must maintain certain reports and records for each 
private equity fund they manage, as well as make them available to the 
SEC for inspection.  These reports and records include information 
about the fund’s assets, trading practices, valuation policies and 
practices, types of assets held, and trading and investment positions.238  
The Act further requires the SEC to share reports and documents with 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a newly established body 
tasked with monitoring systemic risk in the U.S. financial system.239 
The so-called Volcker Rule, named after its creator and former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, prohibits banking 
entities240 from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other 
                                                                                                                                         
in hedge funds or private equity funds, these entities will be subject to additional capital 
requirements and quantitative limits. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(a)(2). 
 237. An adviser with assets under management of less than $100 million and subject 
to state regulation will generally be prohibited from registering with the SEC and must 
register with its state regulator. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 410, § (2).  Furthermore, the 
Dodd-Frank Act contains an exemption from registration for advisers solely to private 
funds if they manage assets under $150 million. See id., sec. 408, § 203.  A private fund 
is defined as any issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act. See 
id., sec. 402, § 202(a)(29).  Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
provides an exemption for an issuer whose securities are owned by not more than 100 
persons, while section 3(c)(7) exempts any issuer who offers its securities to “qualified 
purchasers.”  Therefore, the definition of “private fund” includes private equity funds 
that rely on sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) in order to avoid regulation as an investment 
company. 
 238. Id., sec. 404, § (2)(b)(3). 
 239. Id., sec. 404, § (1)–(2)(b)(7). 
 240. The definition of a banking entity is wide, encompassing any insured 
depository institution, any company that controls an insured bank, any company treated 
as a bank holding company under the International Banking Act, and any affiliate or 
subsidiary of any such entity. 
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ownership interest in a private equity fund.241  It also prohibits them 
from sponsoring a private equity fund, which includes serving as a 
general partner, managing member, or trustee of a fund; selecting or 
controlling the funds’ directors, trustees, or management; or sharing the 
same name as the fund.242  Despite this prohibition, banking entities are 
still allowed to advise such funds. 243   The Volcker Rule creates an 
exception, allowing a banking organization to organize and offer a 
private equity fund and make a de minimis investment in such fund.244  
The entity must provide bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment 
advisory services to such fund and organize and offer the fund solely to 
its customers who use such services.  An investment is permitted 
provided that it has not exceeded 3% of the outstanding ownership 
interests in the fund one year after its establishment.  The total 
investments of a banking entity in such funds should be limited to 3% of 
its Tier 1 capital.  Nonetheless, regulators may prohibit such activities if 
they pose a threat to the financial stability of the banking entity or the 
U.S., involve material conflicts of interest, or would result in a material 
exposure of the banking organization to high-risk assets or trading 
strategies.245 
Overall, the U.S. has decided to adopt a more lenient approach than 
Europe when it comes to regulating private equity.  The U.S. position is 
rooted in the long history of private equity within the country, as well as 
its role as a positive force in promoting business activity.  In contrast to 
the EU’s AIFM Directive, which imposes wide-ranging disclosure 
requirements and mandates the use of depository and valuation 
mechanisms, the Dodd-Frank Act contains registration and limited 
disclosure requirements intended to monitor systemic risk.  Even though 
the private equity industry is unlikely to be a source of systemic risk, 
these requirements do not burden it with insurmountable costs and will 
                                                                                                                                         
 241. A private equity fund is defined as any issuer that would be an investment 
company pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 
3(c)(7) of that Act or any similar fund as the regulators may determine. See id., sec. 
619, § 13(h)(2). 
 242. Id., sec. 619, § 13(h)(5). 
 243. The Dodd-Frank Act, COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS (Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP), July 2012,  available at http://www.skadden.com/insights/ 
skadden-commentary-dodd-frank-act. 
 244. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(G). 
 245. Id., sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(I). 
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therefore not significantly impact LBO activity.  However, the Volcker 
Rule may have a chilling effect on private equity activity since banks are 
an important source of investment capital for private equity. 246   In 
addition, private equity investments represent a negligible amount of 
total bank assets and therefore pose little risk on banks’ balance 
sheets.247  However, one should note that the Volcker Rule seeks to 
regulate a limited segment of the private equity industry, namely banks’ 
investments in and sponsorship of funds.  Though banks are an 
important source of capital for private equity firms, there exists a wide 
array of other institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, 
and university endowments that also serve as investors in private equity.  
For instance, public pension funds, which have long invested in private 
equity, are increasing their allocations to the industry and starting to 
make direct private equity style investments in companies. 248   As a 
result, the rule’s negative impact on the development of the U.S. private 
equity industry is overstated. 
IV. EXPLAINING THE PAST AND PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY 
Despite the hostile legal regime governing private equity 
transactions, the European private equity market managed to grow and 
mature from 1996 onwards, 249  reaching its greatest heights between 
2003 and 2007.  Indeed, between 2000 and 2004, Western Europe was 
able to surpass the U.S. in transaction value.250  2001 was the first time 
that European LBO activity exceeded that of the U.S. 251  Public-to-
private transactions featured prominently during the European LBO 
                                                                                                                                         
 246. Implications of the ‘Volcker Rules’ for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 13 (2010) (statement of Hal 
Scott, Professor, International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School, and Director, 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation). 
 247. Id. at 14. 
 248. Michael Corkery, Public Pensions Increase Private Equity Investments, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020380650457718 
1272061850732.html. 
 249. Wright et al., supra note 9, at 38.  
 250. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 128. 
 251. Jake Powers, The History of Private Equity & Venture Capital, 
CorporateLiveWire (Feb. 20, 2012, 9:24 AM) http://www.corporatelivewire.com/top-
story.html?id=the-history-of-private-equity-venture-capital. 
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boom. 252   Economic forces fueled the growth of private equity and 
overcame its unfavorable legal regime.  The introduction of the common 
currency, the euro, and the development of the European single market 
facilitated cross-border acquisitions by eliminating currency risks and 
investment barriers.  Furthermore, the abundant liquidity in the financial 
system made European banks eager to provide financing to private 
equity sponsors.  European banks were also increasingly willing to 
provide larger loans for private equity transactions.253  The development 
of a European high-yield debt market, virtually non-existent before 
1997, provided an additional source of funding for private equity 
dealmakers.254 
Another important factor was the financialization 255  of Europe 
during the 2000s.  Europe saw its financial sector grow exponentially, 
with European countries embracing the latest innovations of finance.  
The banking sector experienced a boom while investment banking, 
hedge funds, and private equity became household names.  Throughout 
the last decade, European policymakers promoted the liberalization of 
the financial sector and the integration of European financial markets.256  
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the advent of 
globalization and economic liberalism, particularly during the last 
                                                                                                                                         
 252. Mike Wright et al., Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Retrospect and 
Prospect, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE 353, 354 (2009). 
 253. The lending standards of European banks were so lax that, according to Dalip 
Pathak, managing director of Warburg Pincus’ London office, private equity firms 
dealing with banks in Europe “literally had to say to the banks that they did not want to 
take all that money.” See Expect Europe’s Private Equity Market to Contract, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 12, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article.cfm?articleid=2508. 
 254. Brian Hoffmann et al., Europe’s High-Yield Bond Market Evolves, N.Y. L.J., 
Nov. 13, 2001, at M6. 
 255. As Epstein notes, “financialization means the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies.  FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 3 (Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2006). 
 256. The integration of financial markets was one of the goals included in the 
Lisbon Agenda, as it was considered a means of enhancing the efficient allocation of 
capital, thereby promoting growth and employment. See Presidency Conclusions, 
Lisbon European Council (Mar. 23, 2000). 
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decade, led to the relative decline of social democracy257 in Europe and 
the rise of laissez-faire Anglo-Saxon capitalism.258  Global competition 
in the product and capital markets forced European companies to 
restructure their operations, rationalize costs, and adopt the principle of 
shareholder value.259   Private equity investors cooperated with target 
companies, offering their expertise in achieving these goals. 
The adoption of the AIFM Directive has raised concerns about the 
future of the European private equity market. There are growing fears 
that the AIFM Directive could result in an exit of private equity firms 
and funds from Europe, putting the continent at a competitive 
disadvantage versus other markets, such as the U.S.  Nonetheless, even 
assuming that the AIFM Directive’s impact is negative, underlying 
economic forces sparked by the sovereign debt crisis will provide a 
boost to public-to-private activity in Europe. The current debt crisis, 
which began in Greece, spread throughout the periphery of the Eurozone 
and now threatens the survival of the euro. The crisis has obligated 
Member States such as Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Portugal to 
enact broad reforms, including privatizations and labor deregulation. 
These countries have moved forward with ambitious privatization plans 
                                                                                                                                         
 257. According to Gourevitch, “[s]ocial democracy gives voice to claims on the firm 
in addition to those of the shareholders: employee job security, income distribution, 
regional or national development, social welfare and social stability, and nationalism, to 
name a few.” See Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance 
Regulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 1830 (2003) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE 
IMPACT (2003)). 
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Theory and the Corporate Objective Function (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 01-
01, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220671. 
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seeking to enhance the competitiveness of their economies260 and repay 
their massive debt burdens. 261   Additionally, inefficiently run state-
owned companies managed according to the desires of special interest 
groups are natural targets for private equity firms specializing in 
rationalizing costs and restructuring poorly managed enterprises.262 
Furthermore, the debt crisis has obligated southern European 
countries to enact broad-ranging reforms aimed at deregulating their 
rigid labor markets and relaxing their strict employment protection 
regulation. 263   Private equity investments often involve labor 
                                                                                                                                         
 260. For an excellent overview of the beneficial effects of privatizations, see 
William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321 (2001). 
 261. See Alkman Granitsas, Greece Speeds Up Plans to Sell Off State-Held Assets, 
WALL ST. J., May 24, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 
2702304520804576341414080784514.html; Nektaria Stamouli, Greece Accepts 
OPAP’s Bid for State Lotteries, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20121212-706753.html; Eamon Quinn, Ireland 
Identifies State Assets for Sale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203960804577238793257737830.htm
l; Pablo Dominguez, Spain Hires RBS to Privatize Airports, WALL ST. J., June 20, 
2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230393670457639 
7394220462996.html; Stephen L. Bernard, Italy’s Frattini Sees Next Austerity Package 
Soon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424053111904563904576585282025615242.html; Wayne Ma & Patricia Kowsmann, 
China Gets Stake in Portugal’s EDP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577114471370252 
452.html; Patricia Kowsmann, Portugal Shelves TAP Sale, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732446160457819152380 
6172276.html. 
 262. For instance BC Partners and TPG have expressed interest in buying the Greek 
government’s 33% stake in Greek gambling monopoly OPAP. See Stelios Bouras, BC 
Partners, TPG, Among Seven Cleared to Take Part in OPAP Sale, PRIVATE EQUITY 
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restructurings in an effort to improve the performance of the company, 
and a flexible labor regime is therefore crucial for the success of such 
strategies.  Indeed, in their study, Bozkaya and Kerr show that strict 
labor regulations are associated with lower levels of private equity 
investments. 264   Additionally, one would expect that the effect of 
flexible labor regulations would be even more pronounced in cases of 
private equity investment in state-owned companies.  Labor 
restructurings feature predominantly when turning around companies 
with higher labor costs.  Labor unions and politicians collude, using 
state-owned companies in order to promote their self interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The Financial Crisis, the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in the 
U.S., and the AIFM Directive in the E.U., and the run of Mitt Romney 
for President of the United States have put a spotlight on the private 
equity industry on both continents.  This article has attempted to offer a 
comparative examination of the financing and structuring of public-to-
private transactions as well as the regulation of private equity firms in 
the U.S. and Europe.  This assessment reveals a particularly restrictive 
legal regime for transactions and firms in Europe, leading one to expect 
a corresponding effect on the development of the European private 
equity market.  However, to the contrary, underlying economic forces 
have provided and will continue to provide a boost to European private 
equity activity.  Thus, when it comes to European private equity, there is 
no causal link between the strictness of the legal regime and economic 
development.  Rather, economic development shapes its own path, 
unaffected by the prevailing legal regime. 
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